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Abstract
We study the role of endogenous healthcare choices by households to extend their expected
lifetimes on economic growth and welfare in a decentralized overlapping generations econ-
omy with the realistic feature that households’ savings are held in annuities. We character-
ize healthcare spending in the decentralized market equilibrium and its effects on economic
growth. We then identify the moral-hazard effect in healthcare investments when annuity
rates are conditioned on average mortality and explain the conditions under which it will
lead to over-investment in healthcare. Moreover, we specify the general equilibrium effects
and macroeconomic repercussions associated with this moral-hazard effect. Calibrating our
model to OECD data, we find that the moral-hazard effect may be substantial and implies
sizeable welfare losses of approximately 1.5%. At a more general level, our study suggests
that welfare improvements from longevity increases may be quite lower than sometimes as-
sumed when considered in planner economies.
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1 Introduction
In recent decades, nearly all countries have experienced a substantial increase in human longevity.
At least in the developed world, higher expected lifetimes have been accompanied by a significant
increase in healthcare expenditures. For example, life expectancy in the U.S. rose from 69.8 to
78.6 years between 1960 and 2010, while health expenditures, as a share of GDP, surged from
5.2% to 16.4% (according to OECD data).
How does this increased longevity translate into welfare gains? While the existing literature
has approached this question by suggesting extended welfare measures that include longevity,
varying exogenous longevity in growth models and discussing endogenous healthcare choices in
macroeconomic social planner models, this paper introduces a new perspective. We develop
and analyze an endogenous growth model in which longevity is endogenously determined by
households’ demand for healthcare services in a decentralized market economy.1 This perspective
allows us to study the general equilibrium effects and macroeconomic repercussions on economic
growth – and, consequently, the comprehensive welfare effects – of individual healthcare choices.
As we will show, these individual healthcare choices are not necessarily efficient. We partic-
ularly focus on an effect that – while important and most likely involving substantial macroe-
conomic repercussions – has not yet received much attention in the macroeconomic literature:
the moral-hazard effect in healthcare investments arising from annuities. Its importance arises
from the fact that nearly all social security systems crucially depend on (mandatory) annu-
itization, where the annuity premium is not conditional on individual healthcare choices, but
only on average mortality rates. As “Public annuity programs are thus large and growing: in
OECD countries they constitute about one-tenth of the gross domestic product, make up more
than three-quarters of all social insurance, and have contributed to a quarter of the growth in
total public expenditures since 1960” (Philipson and Becker, 1998, p. 552), the properties of
annuities have recently received considerable attention (e.g., Hosseini, 2015 focuses on adverse se-
lection, while Reichling and Smetters, 2015 consider the role of mortality-related medical costs).
While Davies and Kuhn (1992) and Philipson and Becker (1998) provide seminal microeconomic
(partial equilibrium) analyses of the moral-hazard effect of longevity-increasing healthcare in-
vestments, we are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to examine the general equilibrium
effects and its macroeconomic repercussions.
In addition, we use our model to discuss the role of technological progress in healthcare
technology for economic growth and welfare. Finally, we calibrate our model using OECD data
to appreciate the size of the growth and welfare effects associated with moral hazard in healthcare
spending, as well as the effects of technological improvements in the healthcare sector.
From a methodological perspective, our model combines the household side of overlapping
generations perpetual youth models in the tradition of Blanchard (1985) with the production side
of an endogenous growth model in the style of Romer (1986) amended by a healthcare sector. We
1There is a substantial empirical literature on the relationship between health expenditures and life expectancy
that argues that expected lifetime is not given per se but can be influenced by investments in healthcare, such as
improving sanitation, buying medication and inoculations, consulting a physician, etc. (Lichtenberg, 2004; Cutler
et al., 2006; Hall and Jones, 2007; Caliskan, 2009).
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first demonstrate the existence of a unique market equilibrium in the steady-state economy and
discuss the general equilibrium and growth effects of varying healthcare sector sizes. Then, we
characterize and solve the problem of a social planner maximizing the sum of individual lifetime
utilities to identify three inefficiencies in the decentralized market equilibrium: the standard
learning-by-investing externality (Romer, 1986), a spillover effect of healthcare investments on
the productivity of consumption good production and the moral-hazard effect associated with
annuities with returns that are conditioned on average mortality.
We then show how the sign and size of the moral-hazard effect in healthcare investments
depends on the relative changes in the households’ expected consumption paths and expected
lifetime wealth. In the steady-state equilibrium, the result ultimately depends on the difference
in the growth rate of individual household consumption and the growth rate of the economy as
a whole. The difference between the two growth rates originates from the finite lifetimes of the
individuals, thereby leading to the corresponding generations turnover term in the growth rate
of the economy. We show that if the consumption growth rate of the household is positive and
larger than the growth rate of the economy, then individuals over-invest in healthcare in the
decentralized market equilibrium with annuities conditioned on average mortality rather than
individual health status.
What are the macroeconomic implications of over-investment in healthcare? On the one
hand, when households live longer, their propensity to consume out of expected lifetime wealth
declines, as saving for old age becomes more valuable. This increases the economy’s growth rate.
On the other hand, shifting labor from the more capital-intensive consumption good production
into the healthcare sector reduces the marginal return on capital. A lower interest rate decreases
incentives to save and, as a consequence, implies lower economic growth. We show that the first
direct and positive effect of higher longevity on economic growth dominates if the healthcare
sector is rather small; however, given a larger health sector, the indirect and negative effect,
working through the change in the interest rate, prevails. Accordingly, the households’ welfare
is affected by over-investments in healthcare, not only by an imbalance between the enjoyment
of a longer life and its associated direct healthcare costs, as emphasized in the microeconomic
literature, but also by changes to the return on the underlying fundamental of the annuities,
i.e., the return on capital, as well as the wage rate and the economy’s growth rate.
While the theoretical rationale for the importance of examining the general equilibrium ef-
fects and macroeconomic implications of moral hazard associated with annuities unconditioned
on individual healthcare investment is conclusive, are the implications also quantitatively sig-
nificant? Calibrating our model to OECD data, we argue that they are. We find overall welfare
losses due to overspending in healthcare of approximately 1.5%. Decomposing the overall welfare
effect into its different components, we find that the direct impacts due to individual household
behavior are rather small while the general equilibrium effects and the effect on the economy’s
growth rate dominate.
Finally, we investigate the implications of technological improvements in the healthcare sec-
tor. We consider two different types of healthcare improvements. The first type decreases base-
line mortality, which is independent of individual investments in healthcare. One could think
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of improvements in the sanitary infrastructure or behavioral changes such as reduced smoking.
The second type increases the marginal productivity of healthcare expenditures. Examples in-
clude better medication or therapeutic breakthroughs, such as new diagnostic tools or surgeries.2
We show that in our model framework, both types of health technology improvements increase
households’ healthcare investments. The resulting increased life expectancy exerts a direct pos-
itive effect on the economy’s growth rate via a higher incentive to save. However, an associated
increase in healthcare spending will have the indirect negative effect of reducing the interest rate.
Similar to the growth consequences of overspending in healthcare due to moral hazard with un-
conditioned annuities, as discussed previously, technological improvements in health increase the
growth rate when the healthcare sector is very small but have negative growth effects when the
healthcare sector is sufficiently large. To illustrate the welfare effects from improved technology,
we calibrate our model such that it reflects the increase in healthcare investments in the average
OECD country between 1980 and 2005. While our numerical calculations suggest a substantial
welfare gain of approximately 4.5% due to better healthcare technology, we also find that the
moral-hazard effect becomes larger if the healthcare technology improves. Thus, our analysis of
the macroeconomic repercussions of moral hazard due to unconditioned annuity claims suggests
that welfare benefits due to increased longevity may be lower than is often suggested.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we relate our
paper to the existing literature. In Section 3, we introduce the model and provide a detailed
discussion of the household’s maximization problem with respect to healthcare. In Section 4,
we characterize the market equilibrium and derive the dynamics of the aggregate economy. We
identify the inefficiencies in the decentralized market equilibrium in Section 5 by analyzing the
social planner’s solution. In addition, we explain in detail the moral-hazard effect in healthcare
spending due to annuities when their return is not conditioned on the individual household’s
health status. We discuss the role of technological progress in healthcare technology in Section
6 before we provide a numerical simulation of the size of the welfare effects by calibrating our
model to OECD data in Section 7. Finally, we discuss several aspects of our model in relation
to the real world in Section 8 and conclude in Section 9. The proofs of all propositions are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Our main contribution is to develop an endogenous growth model with endogenous lifetime,
in which households determine their healthcare investments in a decentralized market econ-
omy. This innovation provides us with the tools to analyze the general equilibrium effects and
macroeconomic repercussions of distortions in healthcare investments due to annuitized wealth,
as identified in the microeconomics literature. Thus, our paper is related to the following strands
of the literature.
2Our model emphasizes that increases in healthcare expenditures and longevity are driven primarily by the
availability of better healthcare technologies, a view supported, for example, by Newhouse (1992), Cutler et al.
(2006), Suen (2006) and Fonseca et al. (2009).
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In a model that has similarities with our framework, Kuhn and Prettner (forthcoming) ex-
amine the channels through which an expanding healthcare sector affects economic growth and
welfare. They build on the R&D-based endogenous growth model with horizontal innovation
of Prettner (2013) by adding a productive healthcare sector. They find that R&D increases in
response to healthcare investments due to a general equilibrium effect that reduces the interest
rate and, thus, facilitates financing additional research projects. This positive growth effect may
outweigh the negative effect of diverting labor from final goods production when the healthcare
sector is small, but for larger health sectors, economic growth will decline in response to higher
healthcare investments. In this paper, we find a similar growth reaction to an expanding health-
care sector in a model in which growth is driven by capital accumulation. However, the broader
mechanism in our model could be interpreted as resulting from a more detailed underlying pro-
duction side that explicitly includes R&D activities. The main difference between our paper
and Kuhn and Prettner (forthcoming) is our endogenous modeling of individual households’
healthcare choices that allows us to endogenously determine the size of the healthcare sector
and the households’ life expectancies. This innovative feature also distinguishes our paper from
a large body of other papers considering the growth effects of exogenous variations in longevity,
including Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000); Azomahou et al. (2009); de la Croix and Licandro (1999);
Boucekkine et al. (2002); Echevarr´ıa and Iza (2006) and Irmen (forthcoming).3
Chakraborty (2004), Chakraborty and Das (2005), Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007) and Le-
ung and Wang (2010) analyze a neoclassical growth model with endogenous longevity, which
is determined by either household or government investments in health. While savings and
healthcare expenditures compete for the same resources, they are complements in equilibrium.
Thus, higher economic development is accompanied by a longer average lifetime. Combining
endogenous growth with endogenous longevity, van Zon and Muysken (2001) and Aı´sa and
Pueyo (2006) find non-monotonic relationships between longevity and growth. In these papers,
longevity is endogenous but determined via aggregate spending in healthcare by a government
or a social planner. In contrast, we develop an endogenous growth model, in which each house-
hold’s average life expectancy directly depends on the household’s investments in healthcare.
Jones (forthcoming) develops a growth model with R&D in both the consumption goods sector
and the healthcare sector and considers the optimal allocation of investment resources from a
planner’s perspective in an infinitely lived agent framework neglecting any externalities. Our
paper, by contrast, purposefully includes several realistic features, such as a population struc-
ture with overlapping generations and old-age retirement saving in annuities that reflects the
properties of typical social security systems to examine their effects on endogenous healthcare
3More remotely, our paper is also related to the literature on demographic transitions and the literature on
the growth effects of epidemics such as AIDS. The former analyzes the relationship among fertility, mortality
and growth. Longevity is either exogenous (Doepke, 2004; Soares, 2005; Hashimoto and Tabata, 2010; Prettner,
2013), endogenously determined via an externality of aggregate variables such as average income or human
capital (Blackburn and Cipriani, 2002; Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002; Lagerloef, 2003; Cervellati and Sunde, 2005; Hazan
and Zoabi, 2006) or endogenously determined by the healthcare investments of the parents (de la Croix and
Licandro, 2013). Within the latter, Young (2005) concludes that the AIDS epidemic in South Africa, despite
being a humanitarian disaster, has rather positive effects on long-run growth. Bell et al. (2006) and Bell and
Gersbach (2009) are less optimistic and emphasize that epidemics may lead to poverty traps.
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choices and economic growth.
A central focus of our paper is on the moral-hazard effect in healthcare spending associ-
ated with old-age-mortality-contingent claims such as annuities that are conditioned on average
mortality rather than the individual household’s health status. This moral-hazard effect is
identified in partial equilibrium frameworks by Davies and Kuhn (1992), Philipson and Becker
(1998), Sheshinsky (2008) and Kuhn et al. (2015), but – to the best of our knowledge – we are
the first to examine how it percolates through the economy. We argue that this is of utmost im-
portance, as on the one hand, healthcare expenditures represent a substantial fraction of GDP,
with corresponding implications on the aggregate economy, and on the other hand, old-age sav-
ing is, to a large extent, held in annuities. It is also for these two reasons that Reichling and
Smetters (2015) study optimal annuitization with correlated medical costs. As large shares of
retirement wealth are held in mandatory annuities, Hosseini (2015) examines the welfare bene-
fits of this obligation by avoiding adverse selection in the annuity market. We emphasize that
such mandatory annuities entail another distortion, namely the moral-hazard effect in healthcare
spending, which we focus on in our paper, with particular emphasis on its general equilibrium
effects and macroeconomic repercussions. While the macroeconomic implications of unfairly
priced annuities relative to fairly priced annuities are studied in Heijdra and Mierau (2012), we
shift the focus to the macroeconomic implications of annuities when healthcare spending and
longevity are endogenous. Taking the moral hazard effect of annuities on healthcare spending
into account together with several other factors, Zhao (2014) recently argued that the expansion
of social security can explain a large part of the surge in healthcare spending over the last few
decades. Rather than quantifying the effects of expanded social security on healthcare spending,
our focus lies on the effects of healthcare spending on the aggregate economy.
Finally, our paper relates to the literature on the welfare consequences of increased longevity,
for example, Becker et al. (2005) and Jones and Klenow (2010). As in these papers, we employ the
utility of a representative individual to derive a welfare measure that includes human longevity.
However, we use a comprehensive general equilibrium framework, which is absent from those
models. This allows us to identify further channels through which longevity affects welfare.
3 The Model
The model comprises a continuum of households. As in Blanchard (1985), households born at
time s ∈ (−∞,∞) face a hazard rate p(s) of dying that is constant throughout the lifetime
of each household. In our model, however, the hazard rate may vary across households from
different cohorts, as it is determined by the level of medical treatment that the household receives
throughout its lifetime. At any time t, a new cohort is born. We abstract from household fertility
decisions and assume that cohort size grows at the constant and exogenously given rate ν.4 We
normalize the cohort size at time t = 0 to unity.
4The parameter ν can be mapped onto the economy’s fertility rate, which specifies the average number of
children born by each woman (or by our abstract genderless individual). The fertility rate is independent of the
size of the actual population.
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There are two production sectors in the economy: the consumption good sector and the
healthcare sector. We assume that both sectors operate under perfect competition. In addition,
there is a financial sector comprising competitive insurance providers offering annuities. A
central aspect of the paper is the discussion of the implications of annuity premia being (un-
)conditioned on individual households’ mortality rates.
3.1 Healthcare sector
We consider a representative firm in the healthcare sector that provides medical treatment by
solely employing labor.5 Without loss of generality, we assume that one unit of labor produces
one unit of medical treatment. Assuming a competitive healthcare sector, medical treatment
will be offered at the marginal cost w(t). We further assume that households choose a level of
medical treatment h(s), which is fixed over the entire lifetime and determines the hazard rate
of dying p(s) via a healthcare technology H
(
h(s)
)
:
p(s) = H
(
h(s)
)
≡ pmax − ψ[h(s)]
β . (1)
Without medical treatment (h = 0) households face the hazard rate p(s) = pmax of dying.
The hazard rate p(s) decreases with (weakly) diminishing returns in the level of medical treat-
ment h(s), the degree of which is determined by the parameter β ∈ (0, 1). While we preclude a
linear healthcare technology with β = 1 in our definition, we will refer to the linear case when-
ever this yields interesting additional results. The parameter ψ < pmax reflects the productivity
of (a given level of) healthcare investment and may be interpreted as the quality level of the
health system or the state of the art in medical treatment. It denotes the maximum amount
by which a household could reduce its hazard rate against pmax by spending all wage income
on healthcare. While pmax reflects, for example, the sanitary infrastructure of the economy, ψ
increases with the human capital of physicians, the efficiency of hospitals and so forth.
The specification of the healthcare technology (1) implies that improvements in the health-
care technology may come in two qualitatively different ways. First, the maximal hazard rate
pmax may decrease, implying that all households, independent of their levels of healthcare spend-
ing, experience a lower hazard rate of dying. In fact, a decrease in pmax offers higher life ex-
pectancy for free (at least for the individual household). Historical examples in this respect
include new knowledge about germ theory leading to better hygienic standards and a change in
personal behavior. We also interpret the introduction of most vaccines and drugs as a decrease
in pmax because these drugs are usually not very expensive. As an example, consider penicillin,
5Health systems are traditionally highly labor-intensive. According to OECD (2015a), the health sector is a
highly labor-intensive sector, although capital has become a more important production factor in health services
in recent decades. “On average, OECD countries invested around 0.45% of their GDP in 2013 in terms of capital
spending in the health sector. This compares with 8.9% of GDP on average across the OECD for current spending
on healthcare services and medical goods.” (OECD, 2015a, p. 174). There is also a literature that empirically
demonstrates that due to the healthcare sector’s high labor intensity, costs for healthcare services will increase
strongly in response to increases in labor productivity in other sectors, for example, due to technological progress
or capital accumulation (Hartwig, 2008; Bates and Santerre, 2013). This phenomenon is often referred to as
Baumol’s cost disease. Our model also reflects this feature.
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which led to substantial declines in mortality in the last century. Second, the state of the art in
medical treatment ψ may increase, implying that the same amount of healthcare spending leads
to a higher life expectancy. However, only households with positive healthcare spending benefit
from the improved healthcare technology. Consider improvements such as magnetic resonance
imaging, coronary heart bypass grafting, and transplantation.6
3.2 Consumption good production
We consider a representative firm in the consumption good sector that produces a homogeneous
consumption good via a Cobb-Douglas production technology Y (t) ≡ K(t)α
(
A(t)LF (t)
)1−α
,
where α ∈ (0, 1) and K(t) and LF (t) denote the aggregate amount of capital and labor employed
in consumption good production, respectively. A(t) denotes total factor productivity (TFP),
respectively the technological level of the economy, regarding consumption good production and
is taken as given by the representative firm. Capital depreciates at a constant rate δ. Profit
maximization of the representative firm yields factor prices equal to their marginal productivities:
r(t) = α
(
A(t)LF (t)/K(t)
)1−α
− δ , (2a)
w(t) = (1− α)A(t)1−α
(
K(t)/LF (t)
)−α
. (2b)
We specify total factor productivity A(t) as follows:
A(t) ≡
K(t)
LF (t) + (1− η)LH(t)
, η ∈ [0, 1), (3)
where LH(t) represents labor employed in the healthcare sector, reflecting total healthcare
expenditures in the economy at time t. Our specification implies a standard “learning-by-doing”
or “learning-by-investing” externality similar to Romer (1986), where the factor productivity
depends on aggregate capital per worker K(t)/LF (t).7 The term (1 − η)LH(t) captures the
importance of a healthy workforce for productivity. According to (3), consumption good pro-
duction is more productive the higher aggregate healthcare expenditures are. The magnitude
of this spillover effect from health is reflected by the parameter η. The larger η is, the greater
the importance of healthcare for TFP, while the effect vanishes altogether when η = 0. We
assume η ∈ [0, 1). For η = 1, re-assigning labor from consumption good production into the
healthcare sector would have no effective costs in terms of consumption good output, and η > 1
would even imply that the reduction of output by a marginal decrease in the work force in
consumption good production will be overcompensated by the corresponding marginal increase
6Although it makes perfect sense to conceptually distinguish the two different channels of improvements in the
healthcare technology, we wish to emphasize that most real-world improvements simultaneously affect pmax and
ψ. For example, knowledge about germ theory led to better hygienic standards not only in every day life, thereby
decreasing pmax, but also in medical treatment, which increased ψ.
7Romer (1986) assumes that A(t) ≡ K(t). Specifying TFP to depend on capital per worker allows us to avoid
a strong scale effect in the economy’s growth rate. The specification is similar to that introduced by Frankel
(1962).
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of labor in healthcare services, thereby even increasing output in the manufacturing sector. As
this is rather unrealistic, we restrict parameter values to η < 1. However, we provide the results
for the special case of η = 1 whenever insightful.8
3.3 The financial sector
The financial sector of the economy comprises a representative, fully competitive insurance firm
offering actuarial notes as in Yaari (1965). An actuarial note is a “note that consumers can buy
or sell and that stays on the books until the consumer dies, at which time it is automatically
cancelled” (Yaari, 1965, p. 140). A household buying an actuarial note is effectively buying an
annuity that pays a return a. With respect to the annuities’ returns, we distinguish two cases.
In the first case, the insurance company can learn, at no cost, the average probability of
dying p(s) of each cohort but will not be able to observe individual households’ healthcare
investments. Consequently, annuity payments may depend on the cohort and will hence be
written as a function of time t and cohort birth date s: a(t, s).9 Throughout the paper, we
refer to this case as annuity claims that are unconditioned on healthcare expenditures or simply
unconditioned annuities.
In the second case, the insurance company can observe healthcare investments and individual
households’ resulting hazard rates of dying. This allows the insurance company to condition the
annuity rate on the healthcare investments of individual households, and we can write a(t, h),
where h reflects the household’s level of healthcare spending. While this scenario is unrealistic,
it provides an important benchmark scenario in which moral hazard with respect to healthcare
investments is absent.10 We call this case annuity claims conditioned on healthcare investments
or, for short, conditioned annuities.
In our standard model framework, we assume that insurance companies can only observe
average cohort mortality rates, while we consider the case of annuity claims conditioned on
individual households’ healthcare investments in Section 5.3.
8We incorporate the possibility of an effect of health on manufacturing productivity as a spillover effect in our
model for two reasons. First, there are indications of such a spillover effect in the literature (see, e.g., Isaksson,
2007). Second, in our analysis, we focus on the households’ incentives to invest in healthcare to extend their
expected lifetime rather than to increase their labor productivities to obtain higher wages. When the spillover
effect is fully internalized, the households would be able to privately reap the productivity increases from their
healthcare investments, which can be interpreted as increasing their wage rates. While this by itself adds another
motive to invest in healthcare, the households would never invest in their health without an additional longevity
benefit if η < 1.
9As we consider large cohort sizes (technically represented by a continuum of households in each cohort), such
that insurance companies can offer risk-free annuities, perfect competition among insurance companies will lead
to fair annuity payments a(t, s) = r(t) + p(s).
10We are aware that there exist so-called ‘enhanced annuities’ that pay a higher rate if the annuitant is over-
weight or smokes regularly (which is self-certified). However, this conditionality of the return depends on some
negative health behaviors and serious conditions but does not account for positive measures to improve health
and longevity.
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3.4 The households’ optimization problems
Households exhibit identical ex ante preferences and face equal hazard rates for the same levels
of medical treatment. Households born at time s maximize expected discounted lifetime utility
derived from consumption:
U(s) ≡
∫ ∞
s
V
(
c(t, s)
)
exp
[
−
(
ρ+ p(s)
)
(t− s)
]
dt , (4)
where V
(
c(t, s)
)
denotes the instantaneous utility derived from consumption c(t, s) at time t of
the household born at time s, and ρ is the constant rate of time preference. We impose standard
curvature properties on the instantaneous utility function (V ′ > 0 and V ′′ < 0), as well as the
Inada conditions limc→0 V
′(c) = ∞ and limc→∞ V
′(c) = 0. Our definition of lifetime utility (4)
normalizes instantaneous utility of being dead to zero. Hence, we additionally assume a utility
representation with V (c) > 0 for all c > 0, which avoids the possibility of households wishing to
be dead rather than alive.11 At any time when alive, each household is endowed with one unit
of labor that is supplied inelastically to the labor market at wage w(t). In addition, households
may save and borrow assets b(t, s) at the interest rate r(t). Households are born without assets
and may contract against the risk of leaving unanticipated bequests on a perfectly competitive
life insurance market, as described previously. In line with Philipson and Becker (1998) and
Eeckhoudt and Pestieau (2008), among others, we assume that households take a(t, s) as given
and will contrast it with the case in which insurance companies can condition the annuity premia
on a household’s health status in Section 5.3. As negative bequests are prohibited, households
hold their entire wealth in fair annuities. Denoting the costs of healthcare by M
(
h(s)
)
, the
household’s budget constraint reads
b˙(t, s) = a(t, s)b(t, s) + w(t)− c(t, s)−M
(
h(s)
)
, t ≥ s , (5)
with b(s, s) = 0. InsertingM
(
h(s)
)
= h(s)w(t) into the household’s budget constraint (5) yields
the following:
b˙(t, s) = a(t, s)b(t, s) +
(
1− h(s)
)
w(t) − c(t, s) . t ≥ s . (6)
Thus, we can interpret the level of medical treatment h(s) as the fraction of labor income that a
household spends throughout its entire life on healthcare services. This implies that h(s) ∈ [0, 1],
as households are born without assets and must not be indebted when dying.
Households maximize expected intertemporal utility (4) subject to conditions (6) and b(s, s) =
11Rosen (1988) showed that optimal investments in healthcare crucially depend on two characteristics of the in-
stantaneous utility function: (i) the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and (ii) the difference in instantaneous
utility between being alive and dead. One way to ensure positive utility levels is to employ an instantaneous utility
function with an intertemporal substitution elasticity σ > 1. Rosen (1988), Hall and Jones (2007) and Becker
et al. (2005) use V
(
c(t, s)
)
= c(t, s)1−
1
σ /(1− 1/σ) + λ with some positive constant λ. This allows them either to
employ intertemporal substitution elasticities of σ < 1 (Hall and Jones, 2007) or to calibrate the model to differ-
ent values of a statistical life without changing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (Becker et al., 2005;
Hall and Jones, 2007). In our equilibrium analysis, we will use the functional form (11) representing homothetic
preferences, which allow for a balanced-growth path: V
(
c(t, s)
)
= c(t, s)1−
1
σ /(1− 1/σ), σ > 1 .
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0 by choosing an optimal level of medical treatment h(s) and an optimal consumption path
c(t, s). As detailed in the Appendix, the necessary conditions for the household’s optimum are
summarized by the standard consumption Euler equation:
c˙(t, s) = −
V ′(c(t, s))
V ′′(c(t, s))
[a(t, s)− (ρ+ p(s))], (7)
and by the necessary condition for optimal healthcare spending
−
∫ ∞
s
V (c(t, s))H ′(h(s))(t− s) exp[−(ρ+ p(s)))(t− s)]dt
=
∫ ∞
s
V ′(c(t, s))w(t) exp[−(ρ+ p(s))(t− s)]dt .
(8)
These two conditions, together with the budget constraint (6), the initial condition b(s, s) = 0
and the transversality condition for the stock of assets limt→∞ b(t, s) exp [−a(s)(t− s)] = 0,
characterize the households’ optimal choices. The left-hand side of condition (8) represents the
additional utility derived from the increment in expected lifetime associated with a marginal
increase in healthcare spending. The right-hand side reflects the marginal costs of such a higher
expected lifetime, namely less consumption due to higher healthcare expenses. As the instanta-
neous utility function satisfies the Inada conditions, as does the health-production function for
h(s)→ 0, the optimal amount of h(s) will be an interior solution on (0, 1).12 Note that h(s) = 1
is precluded, as this would imply that the household spent its entire labor income on healthcare,
leading to zero consumption at all times it is alive. In this case, the marginal costs in terms of
consumption would be infinite while the expected marginal benefit of healthcare expenditures
is bounded from above.
4 Decentralized Market Equilibrium and Dynamics
We now analyze the decentralized market equilibrium. We will demonstrate the existence and
uniqueness of the decentralized market equilibrium in the steady state. Then, we discuss the
resulting steady-state dynamics of the economy. We conclude with results on the effects of an
enlarged health sector on the equilibrium prices and the economy’s growth rate. These insights
will be important for the subsequent discussions on the growth and welfare consequences of
moral hazard in health spending and the effects of improvements in the healthcare technology.
We begin by introducing aggregate household variables per capita derived by integrating
over all living individuals and dividing by the population size of the economy:
z(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞ z(t, s)N(t, s) ds
N(t)
, (9)
where z(t) and z(t, s) denote aggregate per capita, respectively individual household, variables
and N(t, s) = exp[νs] exp[−p(s)(t−s)] reflects the size of the cohort born at s at time t. Abusing
12If the health-production function had a finite slope at h = 0, the corner solution h = 0 might occur.
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notation slightly, we obtain the population size at time t and hence the labor supply at t by
N(t) =
∫ t
−∞N(t, s)ds.
The economy consists of five markets: the labor market, the capital market, the consump-
tion good market, the market for annuities and the market for healthcare. Accordingly, an
equilibrium in this economy is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Market equilibrium)
A market equilibrium is an allocation {{c(t, s), b(t, s), h(s)}∞s=−∞ ,K(t), L
F (t), LH(t)}∞t=−∞ and
prices {pc(t) = 1, w(t), r(t), {a(t, s)}
∞
s=−∞}
∞
t=−∞ such that profits of the firms (consumption
good, healthcare, annuity) and utilities of the households are maximized and all markets clear
at any time t, i.e.:
K(t) =
∫ t
−∞
b(t, s)N(t, s)ds (capital market) , (10a)
LF (t) + LH(t) = N(t) (labor market) , (10b)∫ t
−∞
h(s)N(t, s)ds = LH(t) (healthcare market) , (10c)∫ t
−∞
(a(t, s)− r(t))b(t, s)N(t, s)ds = −
∫ t
−∞
b(t, s)N˙ (t, s)ds (annuity market) , (10d)∫ t
−∞
[c(t, s) + b˙(t, s)]N(t, s)ds = Y (t) (consumption good market) . (10e)
The left-hand side of the market clearing conditions reflects demand, while the right-hand
side represents the supply of the respective good. Our focus will be on the economy’s steady
state. We refer to a steady state of the economy by the standard definition:
Definition 2 (Steady state)
The economy is in a steady state if consumption per capita, capital per capita and wages grow
at constant rates and the interest rate is constant.
In our equilibrium analysis of the decentralized economy, we use the following functional
form for the individuals’ instantaneous utilities:
V
(
c(t, s)
)
≡
c(t, s)1−
1
σ
1− 1σ
, σ > 1 , (11)
which allows for a balanced-growth path.
We are now in a position to establish the following result:
Proposition 1 (Unique Steady-state Equilibrium)
There exists a unique steady-state equilibrium in which
1. all households choose the same level of healthcare h¯, implying mortality rate p¯ = H(h¯),
2. interest rate r¯(h¯) = α
[
1−h¯
1−ηh¯
]1−α
− δ,
3. wage rate w¯(h¯, t) = k(t)1−α
1−h¯
[
1−h¯
1−ηh¯
]1−α
, and
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4. insurance premium: p¯, i.e. a¯(h¯, p¯) = r¯(h¯) + p¯.
The unique optimal interior level of healthcare expenditures in the steady-state equilibrium h¯
is implicitly given by the equation
σ
1− σ
H ′(h¯)
x(h¯, p¯)
−
1
(1− h¯)
= 0 , (12)
with x(h¯, p¯) ≡ (1− σ)a¯(h¯, p¯) + σ(ρ+ p¯).
The proofs of all propositions are given in the Appendix. The crucial step in the proof is to
derive the households’ optimal healthcare expenditures, provided that the economy is in steady
state, and then to show that these healthcare expenditures lead to the presumed steady state.
Uniqueness follows from the uniqueness of the prices and allocation for a given level of healthcare
expenditures and the fact that given a constant interest rate and constantly growing wage rate,
the households’ healthcare investments are unique.
In the proposition and throughout the paper, we indicate steady-state values by a bar.
Moreover, we will give both h and p as arguments if appropriate rather than just h, as this allows
us to separate the effects of h via longevity p from other channels. It enables us to identify and
clearly illustrate the different ways that healthcare investments affect the economy. In equation
(12), we use the abbreviation x(h¯, p¯) ≡ (1− σ)a¯(h¯, p¯) + σ(ρ+ p¯) = r¯(h¯) + p¯− σ(r¯(h¯)− ρ) > 0,13
which represents the household’s propensity to consume out of expected lifetime wealth. Using
the utility specification (11), the Euler equation (7) identifies the equilibrium growth rate of
the household’s consumption profile in steady state as ghh(h¯) ≡ σ(r¯(h¯)− ρ). Consequently, the
second way of writing x(h¯, p¯) shows that the propensity to consume x(h¯, p¯) reflects the difference
between the return on annuities r¯(h¯) + p¯ and the growth rate of the household’s consumption
ghh(h¯).
Note that N˙(t, s) = −p(s)N(t, s), and consequently, we obtain from (10d) the actuarily fair
premium a(t, s) = r(t) + p(s). Focusing on the steady state, in which the equilibrium interest
rate is constant, we can neglect the time argument and write a¯(h¯, p¯). Moreover, as households
are free to choose between working in the healthcare sector and working in consumption good
production, each household must earn the same equilibrium wage w(t), as given by equation
(2b). Given the consumption good firm’s capital demand, as given by (2a), the allocation and
prices are determined via the households’ supply of capital and demand for healthcare services.
4.1 Equilibrium dynamics
The following proposition characterizes the resulting steady state dynamics of the economy:
Proposition 2 (Steady state dynamics)
The dynamics of the aggregate economy in the steady-state equilibrium
13Note that x(h¯, p¯) > 0 is necessary for the household’s maximization problem to be well-defined.
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(i) is characterized by:
c˙(t) = σ [r¯(h)− ρ] c(t) − x(h¯, p¯)(p¯ + ν)k(t) , (13a)
k˙(t) =
[
r¯(h¯)
α
+
1− α
α
δ − ν
]
k(t)− c(t) , (13b)
(ii) is governed by a unique balanced-growth path growing at the following rate:
g¯(h¯, p¯) =
1
2
{
r¯(h¯)
α
+
1− α
α
δ − ν + σ
[
r¯(h¯)− ρ
]}
−
1
2
√{
r¯(h¯)
α
+
1− α
α
δ − ν − σ
[
r¯(h¯)− ρ
]}2
+ 4x(h¯, p¯)(p¯ + ν) .
(14)
Besides providing a precise description of the economy’s balanced-growth path, Proposition 2
conveys two important insights. First, as on the balanced-growth path c˙(t)/c(t) = k˙(t)/k(t) =
g¯(h¯, p¯), the first equation, showing the evolution of aggregate consumption per capita, reveals
that the growth rate of the household’s consumption profile must be higher than the economy’s
growth rate on the balanced-growth path. This is evident, as the first term of (13a) reflects ghh,
from which a second positive term is subtracted. This latter term, which is the difference in
consumption levels at any time t between the households just born and the households just dying,
reflects the underlying overlapping generations structure of the economy. Second, the economy’s
growth rate on the balanced-growth path is affected by the size of healthcare investments via
two different channels: life expectancy p¯ and the equilibrium interest rate r¯(h¯). In the following
subsection, we examine how these two channels of changes in the size of the healthcare sector
influence equilibrium prices and the economy’s growth rate.
4.2 Equilibrium and growth effects of an expansion of the health sector
The following proposition states how a marginal increase in healthcare expenditures impacts the
steady-state equilibrium and balanced-growth path of the economy:
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium and growth effects of healthcare investments)
(i) An increase in steady-state healthcare investments h¯ increases the equilibrium wage rate
and decreases the equilibrium interest rate.
d w¯(h¯, t)
d h¯
> 0, and
d r¯(h¯)
d h¯
< 0.
(ii) If α < 1/σ, the growth rate of the economy increases with the interest rate, while the dif-
ference between the growth rate of the households’ consumption profiles and the economy’s
growth rate decreases with the interest rate.
d g¯(h¯, p¯)
d r¯(h¯)
> 0,
d
(
ghh(h¯)− g¯(h¯, p¯)
)
d r¯(h¯)
< 0.
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(iii) If α < 1/σ, the direct effect of a larger healthcare sector on the economy’s growth rate is
positive (via increased longevity), while the general equilibrium effect via the interest rate
is negative.
d g¯(h¯, p¯)
d h¯
=
∂g¯(h¯, p¯)
∂p¯
d p¯
d h¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 dir. effect
+
∂g¯(h¯, p¯)
∂r¯(h¯)
d r¯(h¯)
d h¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 indir. effect
An increase in healthcare increases the growth rate if the healthcare sector is sufficiently
small and decreases the growth rate if the healthcare sector is sufficiently large.
A rise in healthcare expenditures re-assigns labor from consumption good production to the
health sector. This contraction of labor supply in manufacturing increases the equilibrium wage
rate. In turn, the marginal productivity of capital declines, as labor is shifted away from the more
capital-intensive sector. Note that this characteristic also stems from our realistic assumption
that the spillover effects of healthcare investments on the productivity of consumption good
production cannot fully compensate for the output loss due to the decline in the workforce
employed in the latter sector.
In part (ii), we examine what such a change in the interest rate implies for economic growth.
In line with economic intuition, we find that an increase in the interest rate positively affects
economic growth by increasing households’ savings. Consequently, a lower interest rate due to
higher healthcare expenditures implies a negative effect on economic growth. Moreover, the
growth rate of the household’s consumption profile is positively related to the interest rate.
Hence, both the consumption growth rate of the households and the economy’s growth rate
decline in response to an expansion of the healthcare sector, and we find that the difference
between the two growth rates widens as a result. That is, the economy’s growth rate has a
steeper slope in r than does the household’s consumption growth rate. The qualifier α < 1/σ
constitutes a sufficient but not necessary condition for the result to hold. In our case, the
coefficient of relative risk aversion is between one and two, which implies an upper bound on
the capital share in consumption good production of between 1/2 and one. Typical values for
α range from 1/3 to 1/2 and do not challenge the condition.
Finally, part (iii) of Proposition 3 describes the growth effects of a larger healthcare sector,
which operate via two channels: (i) longevity and (ii) the equilibrium effects due to changes in the
interest rate. With respect to the former channel, we find that the propensity to consume declines
when households expect to live longer. This implies an increase in savings and, thereby, exerts a
positive effect on the economy’s growth rate. This channel is represented by the term x(h¯, p¯)(p¯+
ν) (see Appendix A.5), which is sometimes referred to in the literature as the “generations
turnover” term. The second channel via the interest rate has already been discussed in parts (i)
and (ii) of the proposition.
The relative sizes of these two effects with opposite signs drive the last result stated in
Proposition 3. When the healthcare sector is small, the increase in longevity from a marginal
increase in healthcare spending is very high according to our specification of the health pro-
duction function, but the effect on the interest rate is rather small and bounded from above.
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Due to diminishing returns in health production, the direct effect of longevity and growth de-
creases when health investments are already substantial. However, shifting additional labor from
manufacturing to healthcare implies huge costs in terms of capital productivity when only few
households are employed in consumption-good production.
5 Inefficiency of the Market Equilibrium
Thus far, we have characterized the decentralized, steady-state market equilibrium and identi-
fied how increasing healthcare expenditures affect the equilibrium prices and the steady state
dynamics of the economy. Yet, a central innovation in our model is that healthcare invest-
ments are endogenously determined by the households’ choices on healthcare expenditures. In
the following, we analyze whether these household choices are efficient and discuss the general
equilibrium and macroeconomic consequences of such inefficiencies.
5.1 The Social Planner’s Solution
To identify potential market failures associated with the households’ choice of healthcare ex-
penditures, we compare the decentralized equilibrium allocation to the allocation that a social
planner maximizing utilitarian welfare would choose.14 Welfare is defined as the weighted sum
of the utilities of all households alive from time t = 0 to infinity. The social planner’s weight on
the lifetime utilities of different cohorts is equal to the time preference rates of the households.
This implies that the lifetime utility of a household born at time s will be discounted to time 0
with the time preference rate ρs = ρ.15
Then the planner’s problem is given by:
max
{{c(t,s)}∞t=0,h(s)}
∞
s=0
∫ ∞
0
V(t)dt,
where V(t) =
∫ t
−∞
V (c(t, s)) exp[−(ρ+ p(s))(t− s)] exp[νs] exp[−ρss]ds,
s.t. p(s) = H(h(s)),
N(t) =
∫ t
−∞
exp[νs− p(s)(t− s)]ds,
LH(t) =
∫ t
−∞
h(s) exp[νs− p(s)(t− s)]ds,
LF (t) = N(t)− LH(t),
14As our focus is on moral hazard originating from unconditioned annuities, we could simply identify their
effect at the macro level by including annuities conditioned on individual household mortality in the decentralized
equilibrium. While not trivial, we nevertheless solve the social planner’s problem to be transparent with respect to
all market inefficiencies and potential interactions of other inefficiencies with the moral-hazard effect. Moreover,
it allows us to provide simulation results on the size of the moral-hazard effect with and without correction of the
other market failures.
15For a discussion of the effects of the relationship between individual time preference rates and that of the
social planner on the allocation of consumption across different age cohorts, see for example, Schneider et al.
(2012).
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C(t) =
∫ t
−∞
c(t, s) exp[νs− p(s)(t− s)]ds,
K˙(t) = F (K(t), LF (t), LH(t))− δK(t) − C(t),
and initial conditions specifying {h(s)}s=0−∞ and K(0) and N(0).
V(t) represents aggregate welfare at time t, i.e., the sum of instantaneous utilities of all
households alive at time t. Despite assuming ρs = ρ, we include the planner’s time preference
rate ρs in the welfare specification for clarity of expression. The first constraint represents
the healthcare technology, while the second reflects the economy’s population size at time t by
summing the still living individuals of all cohorts born at the different birth dates s ≤ t. For
reasons of comparability with the decentralized solution, the planner determines one unique
level of healthcare h(s) for the households in the cohort born at time s that is fixed throughout
their lifetimes. Consequently, the demand for healthcare at time t, LH(t), sums the individual
healthcare demands of all households alive at time t. The remaining share of the population
works in the consumption good sector. The last two constraints specify aggregate consumption
and the equation of motion of the aggregate capital stock.
The planner’s problem cannot be solved directly with the standard approach via optimal
control theory because of (i) the double integral in the objective function and (ii) the integral
constraints, whereby the integrals cannot be eliminated by differentiation. Regarding issue (i),
we split the problem into an “inner problem,” in which the social planner allocates a given
amount of consumption across all generations alive in a period t. Our assumption ρs = ρ
implies that it is optimal for the social planner to distribute consumption equally such that
every household enjoys consumption c(t, s) = cˆ(t) = C(t)/N(t), ∀s. Inserting this into the
objective function, we obtain the “outer problem” of finding the optimal path C(t) and h(t).
This, however, does not eliminate issue (ii). Therefore, we solve the outer problem by setting up
the Lagrangian and interchanging the order of integration of the constraints such that we are
able to use the calculus of variations to derive necessary conditions for an optimum. The detailed
solution to the planner’s problem is provided in the Appendix. For the necessary conditions for
a welfare maximum, we obtain the familiar expressions for the optimal path of consumption and
capital:
˙ˆc(t) = −
V ′(cˆ(t))
V ′′(cˆ(t))
(
∂F (K(t), LH(t), LF (t))
∂K(t)
− δ − ρ
)
, (15)
k˙(t) = F (k(t), lH (t), lF (t))− δk(t) −
N˙(t)
N(t)
k(t)− cˆ(t), (16)
where lF (t) = L
F (t)
N(t) and l
H(t) denote the shares of labor in manufacturing and healthcare,
respectively. The main novelty of our approach lies in the characterization of the optimal levels
of healthcare. We obtain the following necessary condition that the level of healthcare of any
generation born at time s ≥ 0 satisfies in the social planner’s optimum:
−
∫ ∞
s
V (cˆ(t))H ′(h(s))(t − s) exp[−(ρ+ p(s))(t− s)]dt
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−∫ ∞
s
wH(t)V ′(cˆ(t)) exp[−(ρ+ p(s))(t− s)]dt
= −
∫ ∞
s
V ′(cˆ(t))cˆ(t)H ′(h(s))(t − s) exp[−(ρ+ p(s))(t− s)]dt (17)
−
∫ ∞
s
wH(t)V ′(cˆ(t))h(s)H ′(h(s))(t − s) exp[−(ρ+ p(s))(t− s)]dt
+
∫ ∞
s
w(t)V ′(cˆ(t))H ′(h(s))(t − s) exp[−(ρ+ p(s))(t− s)]dt,
where wH(t) = ∂F
∂LF (t)
− ∂F
∂LH (t)
reflects the effective marginal opportunity costs of an additional
unit of labor in healthcare. We denote by w(t) the marginal product of labor in the consump-
tion good sector, which reflects the wage rate in the decentralized market equilibrium.16 In
addition to the planner’s uniform distribution of consumption, conditions (15)–(17) reveal three
differences from their counterparts in the decentralized market economy, which we discuss in
the following.
5.2 Externalities in the Market Equilibrium
Comparing the social planner’s solution to the decentralized market equilibrium, as defined in
Definition 1, we identify three market failures: the “learning-by-investing” externality (Romer,
1986), a spillover effect of health on consumption good production and moral hazard in health-
care investments.
We identify the standard ‘learning-by-investing’ externality by comparing the consumption
Euler equation of the social planner (15) with the household’s (7) in equilibrium, where a(t, s) =
r(t) + p(s), according to equilibrium condition (10d). Consequently, the difference between the
consumption path of the households in the decentralized equilibrium relative to that in the social
planner’s optimum originates from the difference in the return on capital: The social rate of
return ∂F (K(t), LH (t), LF (t))/∂K(t)− δ =
(
A(t)LF (t)/K(t)
)1−α
− δ is larger than the private
return r(t) = α
(
A(t)LF (t)/K(t)
)1−α
− δ because firms take the technological level A(t) of the
economy as given, neglecting the positive spillovers that the employment of capital exerts on
the economy’s manufacturing output Y (t) via an increase in the technological level.17 As is
well known, this leads to an inefficiently low level of asset holdings that could be corrected, for
example, by subsidizing household savings.
16Specifically, writing F (K(t), LH(t), LF (t)) = A(t)1−αK(t)αLF (t)1−α with A(t) = K(t)/(N(t) − ηLH(t)),
where we use the definition of A(t) as in Section 3.2 and the fact that N(t) = LF (t) + LH(t), we obtain for
the partial derivative with respect to LF (t) the expression ∂F/∂LF (t) = (1− α)A(t)1−αK(t)αLF (t)−α[= w(t)],
while we obtain for the partial derivative with respect to LH(t), ∂F/∂LH(t) = ηK(t)/[N(t) − ηLH(t)]2(1 −
α)A(t)−αK(t)αLF (t)1−α. Consequently, we can write wH(t) = w(t)(1− η)N(t)/(N(t)− ηLH(t)).
17Note that cˆ(t) in the planner’s solution reflects each household’s consumption level at time t and, thus,
also the level of aggregate consumption per capita. The two consumption levels would differ if the planner’s
intragenerational distribution of consumption were not uniform, as is the case in the decentralized economy,
where the disparity between c(t, s) and c(t) reflects the difference between the high consumption levels of those
dying at t and the low consumption levels of those born at t. As cˆ(t) reflects aggregate consumption per capita,
the law of motion of the aggregate per capita capital stock in the social planner’s solution (16) is equivalent to
that in the decentralized equilibrium, which can be derived by applying (9) to (5) while considering equilibrium
condition (10a).
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The other two inefficiencies are associated with healthcare expenditures. The two expressions
on the left-hand side of equation (17) are familiar from the household’s first-order condition (8).
They reflect the additional utility obtained directly from a higher expected lifetime and the
direct healthcare costs arising from higher labor input in the healthcare sector at the expense
of labor in consumption good production. Comparing the social planner’s optimality condition
(17) and the household’s first-order condition (8), we notice two important differences: First,
there is a wedge between the social marginal costs of healthcare wH(t) and the private marginal
costs of healthcare w(t) that results from households’ inability to directly reap the benefits of
the positive spillover of health investments on productivity in manufacturing. Thus, healthcare
investments in the decentralized economy are, ceteris paribus, lower than socially optimal. This
market failure could be corrected by subsidizing healthcare investments in the amount of the
difference between w(t) and wH(t).
Second, the terms on the right-hand side of the social planner’s optimality condition with
respect to healthcare investments (17) do not appear in the corresponding first-order condition
(8) of the household in the decentralized economy. This represents the moral-hazard effect with
respect to healthcare spending, as households take annuity rates as given. This effect comprises
three parts, as indicated by the three integrals on the right-hand side of (17). The first term
represents the utility loss from lower consumption at each point in time, as consumption has to
be spread out over a longer expected lifetime. The second term captures the additional costs
of healthcare that accrue during the expected additional lifetime of the individual. Third, the
additional expected lifetime also allows an individual to earn additional labor income, thereby
increasing total labor wealth. Consequently, the sign of the moral-hazard effect depends on
the relative sizes of the marginal losses due to lower consumption and increased healthcare
expenditures and the marginal benefits from higher labor wealth. Although the sign of the
moral-hazard effect is generally ambiguous, in the steady-state equilibrium, the moral-hazard
effect leads to over-investments in healthcare, as we show below.
While we believe that, in reality, the two spillover effects of capital investment and health-
care investments on the economy’s productivity in manufacturing are present and important
in decentralized market economies, our focus in this paper is on the inefficiency resulting from
moral hazard in healthcare spending when annuity rates are not conditioned on individual mor-
tality rates, as in typical social security systems in most developed countries. Therefore, we
now contrast the outcome of the decentralized equilibrium without conditioned annuities with
its hypothetical counterpart when annuities conditioned on health status can be supplied by the
insurance firm and, thus, no moral-hazard effect arises.
5.3 Market Equilibrium without Moral Hazard
We now assume that insurance companies can observe and condition annuity rates a(t, h) on
the individual household’s healthcare investment. As a consequence, a household increasing its
healthcare investments will face a lower annuity rate. As all households of the same cohort s
face the identical optimization problem, all households of a given cohort s will choose the same
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level of healthcare investments h(s). Thus, we can still represent the cohort born at time s by a
representative household. To minimize notation, we again write the annuity rate as a function of
s, a(t, s), with the difference being that now ∂a(t, s)/∂h(s) is no longer zero but negative. Given
fair annuity rates, as will arise in the market equilibrium with perfect competition, ∂a(t, s)/∂h(s)
will amount to the marginal productivity of the healthcare technology H ′(h(s)).
For the representative household’s optimization problem, this implies that a marginal in-
crease in healthcare investments affects the budget constraint not only via the direct costs but
also via changes in the annuity rate. The household’s forward budget constraint (see Appendix
A.1) reveals that the household’s lifetime consumption stream must be financed by the expected
lifetime labor income:
b(s, s) =
∫ ∞
s
[c(t, s)− (1− h(s))w(t)] exp
[
−
∫ t
s
a(t′, s)dt′
]
dt. (18)
A decline in the annuity rate a(t, s) due to a reduction of p(s) will increase the expected net
present value of both the consumption stream to be financed and the wealth from lifetime labor
income. This reflects the additional consumption needed for the additional expected lifetime and
the extra labor income from an longer expected work life, resembling the respective expressions
in the social planner’s solution. Whether a decline in a(t, s) places additional pressure on the
budget constraint or relaxes it depends on the trajectories of consumption and wage rates over
time t and, hence, on their initial values at birth date s and their growth rates over time
t. Consequently, the sign of the effect depends on the equilibrium dynamics of the economy,
which, as shown in Proposition 3, are also influenced by aggregate health expenditures.
To determine the sign and size of the moral-hazard effect, we begin by deriving the house-
hold’s necessary conditions for a utility maximum. While the optimality conditions with respect
to savings and consumption take the same form as presented in Section 3.4, the first-order
condition with respect to healthcare (8) becomes the following:
−
∫ ∞
s
V (c(t, s))H ′(h(s))(t − s) exp[−(ρ+ p(s)))(t − s)]dt
−
∫ ∞
s
V ′(c(t, s))w(t) exp[−(ρ+ p(s))(t− s)]dt
= −
∫ ∞
s
V ′(c(t, s)) c(t, s)
∂a(t, s)
∂h(s)
(t− s) exp[−(ρ+ p(s))(t− s)]dt
+
∫ ∞
s
V ′(c(t, s))(1 − h(s))w(t)
∂a(t, s)
∂h(s)
(t− s) exp[−(ρ+ p(s))(t− s)]dt .
(19)
The left-hand side of equation (19) is identical to the first-order condition when households
take the annuity rate as given. The right-hand side of (19) presents the additional terms reflect-
ing the consequences of health investments that reduce the annuity rate. It reflects the influence
on the household’s budget constraint, as discussed above, evaluated in terms of marginal utility.
As noted above, given fair annuity rates a(t, s) = r(t)+p(s) we obtain ∂a(t, s)/∂h(s) = H ′(h(s)),
thereby resembling the right-hand side of the social planner’s optimality condition for health-
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care investments (17). Note that the difference from the social planner’s necessary condition
for healthcare investments is that the marginal costs of healthcare are higher than the social
marginal costs due to the positive spillovers of healthcare onto consumption good production,
which has not been internalized here.18 As already conjectured, the expression on the right-hand
side of (19) reveals that the sign of the first term is positive, while the sign of the second term
is negative. Consequently, the effect of conditioned annuity contracts on healthcare investments
is, in general, ambiguous. Relative to the solution in which annuity rates are taken as given, an
individual will spend more (less) on healthcare if the additional labor income wealth exceeds (is
smaller than) the additional consumption requirements.
We define the market equilibrium analogously to Definition 1, with the sole difference being
that the insurance firm can now verify healthcare investments at the individual household level.
Again, perfect competition in the financial sector ensures fair annuity rates.19 In the following
proposition, we show that when the households’ utilities take the form as in (11), there exists
a steady-state equilibrium with conditioned annuity contracts that is unique under a plausible
condition.
Proposition 4 (Steady-state equilibrium without moral hazard)
Suppose that annuity rates can be conditioned on individual healthcare investments. Then, there
exists a steady-state market equilibrium in which all prices are characterized as in Proposition 1,
2.–4., and all households invest the same amount in healthcare. The interior level of healthcare
expenditures in the steady-state equilibrium h¯ is implicitly given by the equation
σ
1− σ
H ′(h¯)
x(h¯, p¯)
−
1
(1− h¯)
= −H ′(h¯)
(
1
x(h¯, p¯)
−
1
y(h¯, p¯)
)
. (20)
The equilibrium is unique if dx(h¯,p¯)
y(h¯,p¯)
/dh¯ < 0.
We employ the abbreviation y(h¯, p¯) = r¯(h¯)+ p¯− g¯(h¯, p¯) to denote the difference between the
equilibrium annuity rate a¯(h¯, p¯) = r¯(h¯) + p¯ and the economy’s steady-state growth rate. The
condition for uniqueness of the steady-state equilibrium given in the proposition is a sufficient but
not necessary condition. More generally, the steady-state equilibrium is unique if the increase in
the relationship between the households’ propensity to consume out of wealth and the difference
between the annuity rate and the economy’s growth rate with respect to h¯ is sufficiently small.
In the following, we assume a unique equilibrium.20
18When internalizing the healthcare spillover, the first-order condition (19) will resemble the social planner’s
optimality condition (17) with the difference being that the consumption path {c(t, s)}∞t=s differs from the social
planner’s solution due to the “learning-by-investing” externality and the social planner’s uniform intra-temporal
distribution of consumption across all generations alive (resulting from the pure time preference rate of the planner
being identical to those of the households).
19Fair annuity rates result from perfect competition, as a lower than fair annuity rate leading to profits for
an insurance firm can profitably be overbid by competitors. Offering higher than fair rates for some levels of
healthcare spending means cross-subsidization is necessary from households with other healthcare levels. Cross-
subsidization will not be possible, as other firms can profitably overbid the excessively low annuity rate at a
particular healthcare spending level.
20Over the whole parameter range of the sensitivity analyses of our numerical illustration (see Section 7 and
Appendices A.9 and A.10, we obtain unique equilibria.
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The right-hand side of (20) collects the additional terms entering the first-order condition
due to conditioned annuity claims and, thus, is the steady-state equivalent of the right-hand
side of equation (19). In fact, computing the integrals using steady-state values, the right-hand
side of (19) yields
−c(s, h¯, p¯)−1/σH ′(h¯)
[
c(s, h¯, p¯)
[x(h¯, p¯)]2
−
(1− h¯)w(s, h¯)
[y(h¯, p¯)]2
]
, (21)
where c(s, h¯, p¯)−1/σ is the marginal utility of consumption at birthdate s and −H ′(h¯) denotes
the increase in longevity and, simultaneously, the reduction in the annuity rate for a marginal
increase in healthcare expenditures. The term in brackets is the difference between the additional
consumption needed for the additional lifetime and the additional wealth in terms of labor income
net of extra healthcare costs. Thus, the term in brackets echoes the increased pressure (or release
of pressure) on the budget constraint (18) from a marginal increase in longevity increasing
healthcare investments. The sign and size of this effect is determined by the difference between
x(h¯, p¯) and y(h¯, p¯), which reflects the difference between the growth rate of the household’s
consumption profile ghh(h¯) = σ(r¯(h¯) − ρ) and the growth rate of the economy in steady state
g¯(h¯, p¯), as well as by the relationship between the level of initial consumption by the household
c(s, h¯, p¯) and the level of net labor income at date s (1 − h¯)w(s, h¯). In addition to x(h¯, p¯) and
y(h¯, p¯), the equilibrium level of initial consumption c(s, h¯, p¯) is also affected by the equilibrium
interest rate and the economy’s growth rate, as it depends on the household’s net present lifetime
wealth. As a consequence, both the size and sign of the moral-hazard effect in general equilibrium
is ex ante ambiguous.
The solution to the household’s utility maximization problem provides a link between the
initial wage rate and initial consumption c(s, h¯, p¯). In steady state, we obtain c(s, h¯, p¯) =
(1− h¯)W (s, h¯, p¯)x(h¯, p¯), where W (s, h¯, p¯) = w(s, h¯)/y(h¯, p¯) denotes the net present value of the
household’s lifetime labor income. Inserting into (21) yields, after some transformations, the
right-hand side in the household’s first-order condition (20) in the steady-state equilibrium. This
indicates that the sign of the moral-hazard effect is determined by the relationship between the
growth rate of the household’s consumption profile, which is part of x(h¯, p¯), and the growth
rate of the economy, as in y(h¯, p¯). As we have shown, ghh(h¯) > g¯(h¯, p¯) and, consequently,
y(h¯, p¯) > x(h¯, p¯), implying that the right-hand side of (20) is positive. Therefore, in the steady-
state market equilibrium with conditioned annuity rates, households’ healthcare spending is
lower than in the steady-state equilibrium with unconditioned annuity rates. This result is
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Over-investment in healthcare)
In the steady-state equilibrium with mortality contingent annuity claims, the households invest
less in healthcare than in the steady-state equilibrium where annuity rates cannot be conditioned
on individual healthcare investments.
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6 Improvements in the Healthcare Technology
One central reason for the increase in healthcare spending is technological progress in the health-
care sector (Chernew and Newhouse, 2012). Therefore, we are interested in how improvements
in the healthcare technology affect healthcare spending, the size of the moral-hazard effect, wel-
fare and economic growth. While we examine these questions numerically in the next section,
we now discuss theoretically how the aggregate economy is affected by changes in the healthcare
technology.
Recall that the healthcare technology (1) exhibits two parameters that influence the hazard
rate p of households. A decline in the parameter pmax reduces the hazard rate that households
face without investments in healthcare. An increase in the parameter ψ increases the reduction
of the hazard rate that is purchased for any given healthcare investment h. As stated in the
following proposition, an improvement in the healthcare technology either via a decrease in pmax
or an increase in ψ leads to higher equilibrium healthcare investments, independent of whether
annuity rates are conditioned on healthcare expenditures. The resulting effect on economic
growth depends, once more, on the size of the healthcare sector.
Proposition 6 (Improvements in the healthcare technology)
In the steady-state market equilibrium,
(i) the following conditions hold:
dh¯
dpmax
< 0 ,
dp¯
dpmax
> 0 ,
dh¯
dψ
> 0 ,
dp¯
dψ
< 0 ,
(ii) improvements in the healthcare technology increase the economy’s growth rate if h¯ is small
and decrease it if h¯ is sufficiently large.
In the special case of η = 1, improvements in the healthcare technology increase economic
growth:
dg¯(h¯, p¯)
dpmax
< 0 ,
dg¯(h¯, p¯)
dψ
> 0 .
A better healthcare technology affects the equilibrium hazard rate of dying p¯ in two ways.
First, there is a direct effect. Ceteris paribus, a decrease in pmax or an increase in ψ lowers the
hazard rate p¯. Second, an improvement in the healthcare technology induces higher healthcare
expenditures. This is also the case for a decrease in pmax, although pmax enters p in an additively
separable way. The reason is that the marginal effect of a decrease in p is proportional to the
discount factor exp[−p(t− s)]. As a consequence, any decrease in p – for whatever reason – will
trigger higher healthcare expenditures.21 Note that in our model, the direct effect of a marginal
decrease in pmax, reflected by the partial derivative ∂p/∂pmax, is equal to one. A marginal
increase in the productivity of healthcare spending ψ implies a direct effect of hβ . Because
21This is a standard feature of life-cycle models (see, e.g., Murphy and Topel (2006)).
22
hβ < 1, the increase in expected lifetime that comes for “free” is larger when pmax marginally
declines compared to a marginal increase in ψ. As a consequence, if a marginal decrease in pmax
and a marginal increase in ψ lead to the same reduction in the hazard rate of dying, the decline
via the increase in the productivity of health spending ψ is accompanied by higher healthcare
expenditures.
By increasing longevity for given healthcare investments h¯, technological improvements in
the healthcare sector increase the economy’s growth rate. As better technology in the health-
care sector also increases health spending, it further involves the equilibrium and growth effects
of an expansion of the healthcare sector, as discussed in Proposition 3. Therefore, relative to
the results provided in Proposition 3, technological improvements in healthcare exert an addi-
tional positive, but limited in size, effect on longevity in addition to that operating through an
increase in healthcare investments. Consequently, when the healthcare sector is small, techno-
logical improvements in the healthcare sector positively affect economic growth. However, the
negative effects on economic growth stemming from a declining marginal productivity of capital,
as labor is re-assigned to the healthcare sector, will dominate when the healthcare sector is suf-
ficiently large. Thus, technological improvements in healthcare increase economic growth when
the healthcare sector is small and decrease growth when the healthcare sector is large. In the
special case in which the spillovers from healthcare on productivity in manufacturing are very
large, i.e., η = 1, the costs in consumption good output from shifting labor from manufacturing
to healthcare are fully compensated by the spillover on productivity. Then, only the positive
effect on economic growth via increased longevity remains, as indicated in Proposition 6.22
7 Numerical Simulations
In the following, we illustrate our theoretical findings via a numerical simulation. To abstract
from country-specific peculiarities in the healthcare system to the greatest extent possible, we
calibrate our model to the OECD average of healthcare expenditures and life expectancy. Among
all OECD countries for which data were available in 1980, average lifetime at birth increased
from 73.1 years in 1980 to 79.4 years in 2005.23 Over the same time horizon, the average
healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP increased from 6.1% to 8.7% while GDP per capita
grew at an average rate of 2.05%.
For all other parameters in our model economy, we choose plausible real-world values. For
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ, we follow Murphy and Topel (2003), who suggest
a value of ε = (u′(c)c)/u(c) = 0.346, which is also used by Becker et al. (2005). For our
instantaneous utility function (11), this translates to σ = 1.529, which we round to σ = 1.5.
22It would also be interesting to know how the size of the moral-hazard effect is affected by improvements in
the healthcare technology. However, from a theoretical perspective, the effect is ambiguous, and thus, the answer
to this question depends on the values of the exogenous parameters of the model. We will, however, examine the
change in the size of the moral-hazard effect in our numerical simulations in the next section.
23We average life expectancy at birth and healthcare expenditures for all OECD countries for which data are
available both in 1980 and 2005. In particular, this excludes Chile, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary,
Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Sweden. See also Appendix A.9 for
details on the numerical illustration.
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Symbol Description Value Range
ρ Time preference rate 2%
σ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1.5
ν Growth rate of cohort size 0%
α Value share of labor 0.35 . . .0.5 . . . 0.65
δ Capital depreciation rate 5% . . .7.5% . . . 10%
η Positive spillover of healthcare spending on TFP 0 . . .0.15 . . . 0.3
β Curvature parameter of healthcare technology 0.5 . . .0.75 . . . 1
pmax Hazard rate of dying without healthcare Calibrated to match data
ψ Marginal impact of healthcare spending on longevity Calibrated to match data
h Share of labor income spend on healthcare Taken from data
T Life expectancy Taken from data
Table 1: Summary of the model parameters used in the numerical illustration. In cases of value
ranges, a sensitivity analysis is employed, where the reference case is denoted in bold.
The utility discount rate is set to ρ = 2%. Employing a broad definition of capital, we set
the capital share α = 0.5 and the capital depreciation rate δ = 7.5%. Yet, we also perform
sensitivity analyses with α ranging between 0.35 and 0.65 and δ varying between 5% and 10%.
In addition, we abstract from population growth, i.e., ν = 0, as we employ data on GDP per
capita.
Crucial parameters in our model are the positive externality from healthcare spending on
total factor productivity measured by the spillover parameter η and the healthcare technology
characterized by pmax, ψ and β. To calibrate our model to real-world data, we apply the following
procedure. We fix η and β and then calibrate pmax and ψ to match observed lifetime expectancy
and healthcare spending rates. Unfortunately, there is no easy way to observe the spillover
parameter η and the curvature parameter β of the healthcare technology. As a consequence, we
perform a sensitivity analysis with a broad value range for both parameters. For η, we employ
a range between 0 and 0.3 and for β a range between 0.5 and 1, where we consider η = 0.15 and
β = 0.75 as the reference scenario. Finally, we derive the level of healthcare expenditures h in our
model by dividing observed healthcare expenditures as a percentage of GDP by 2(1−α): On the
one hand, h in our model is the share of labor income spent on healthcare rather than the share
of total GDP. Assuming a labor share of 1 − α, we divide the data on health expenditures per
GDP by this number. On the other hand, not all health expenditures are effective in prolonging
life. Assuming that half of the expenditures affect the individuals’ life expectancy leads to the
factor of 1/[2(1 − α)] given above. Table 1 summarizes our parameter calibration.
In line with our endogenous growth model, we assume that increases in average lifetime stem
from the interplay of improvements in the healthcare technology and the endogenous choice of
healthcare spending. This implies that the growth and interest rates of the economy depend on
the healthcare technology and the healthcare expenditures. We now calculate these rates and
the expected lifetime utility of an individual household in a steady-state economy in two different
scenarios: (i) with the healthcare technology of 1985 and (ii) with the healthcare technology
of 2005. To concentrate on the effects of the healthcare technology, we assume that all other
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Scenario (i) Scenario (ii)
T = 73.1 [a] h = 6.1 [%] T = 79.4 [a] h = 8.7 [%]
Regime (a)
pmax [%] 1.4420 1.3662
ψ [%] 0.6028 0.6664
r [%] 3.61 3.38
g [%] 2.14 1.96
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 4.55
Regime (b)
h [%] 5.54 8.04
T [a] 72.83 79.02
r [%] 3.64 3.51
g [%] 2.18 2.01
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 4.86
Comparison regime (a) → (b)
∆U(a)→(b) [%] 1.29 1.58
∆Udirect [%] 0.011 0.013
∆Uequil [%] −0.22 −0.27
∆Ugrowth [%] 1.50 1.84
Table 2: Utility gains (compensating variation) for a hypothetical average OECD country from
improvements in the healthcare technology and switching from an unconditioned to a conditioned
annuity claims regime.
aspects of the economy, such as the consumption good production technology and the initial
capital endowment per capita, are the same.24 We analyze two different annuity regimes. In
regime (a), we assume that annuity payments cannot be conditioned on healthcare choices, which
we consider the status quo. As a consequence, we calibrate the healthcare technologies of 1985
and 2005 to match observed healthcare expenditures and life expectancy. In regime (b), which
we consider the counterfactual scenario, we assume that annuity payments are conditioned on
healthcare expenditures.
To compare the expected lifetime utilities of two individuals under two different scenarios,
we calculate the compensating variation, i.e. the percentage increase in consumption that an
individual under the first regime had to enjoy to experience the same expected lifetime utility as
the individual would under the second regime. The difference ∆U in expected lifetime utilities
is either due to the improvement in the healthcare technology if we compare scenarios (i) and
(ii) or due to the moral hazard induced by unconditioned annuity claims if we compare scenarios
(a) and (b).
The results for our reference specification are shown in Table 2. In scenario (i), the health-
care technology has been calibrated to resemble the life expectancy (73.1 years) and healthcare
expenditures (6.1% of GDP) of the average OECD country in 1985, while in scenario (ii),
24Note, however, that steady-state population size depends on the expected lifetime, as the cohorts’ initial sizes
when born are fixed and constant.
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the healthcare technology mimics the life expectancy (79.4 years) and healthcare expenditures
(8.7% of GDP) of the average OECD country in 2005. Comparing the calibrated healthcare
technologies, we observe that the hazard rate for mortality without healthcare treatment pmax
has declined and the marginal productivity of the healthcare technology ψ has improved. This
implies that in scenario (ii), individuals live – on average – longer than in scenario (i) even with-
out any healthcare expenditures, and each percentage point of wage income spent on healthcare
in scenario (ii) reduces mortality to a greater extent than in scenario (i). As a result of the
improved healthcare technology, individuals spend a higher percentage of their wage income
on healthcare in scenario (ii): h increases from 6.1% to 8.7%. This has implications for the
steady-state equilibrium of the economy. The interest rate decreases from 3.61% to 3.38%, and
the growth rate declines from 2.14% to 1.96%. Despite a lower interest and growth rate, the
expected lifetime utility of individuals has increased by 4.55%.25
First, we now analyze what would have happened in scenarios (i) and (ii) if annuity claims
were conditioned on healthcare expenditures while all other fundamentals of the economy (in-
cluding the healthcare technology) remained unchanged. We find that steady-state healthcare
expenditures in both scenarios decrease while the interest and growth rates increase. In scenario
(i), healthcare investments are reduced from 6.1% to 5.54%, resulting in a lower life expectancy
of 72.83 years (a decrease of approximately 3 months). However, the interest rate increases
from 3.61% to 3.64%, and the growth rate rises from 2.14% to 2.18%. Similarly, healthcare
expenditures in scenario (ii) decline from 8.7% to 8.04%, resulting in a decline in life expectancy
from 79.4 to 79.02 years (a decrease of approximately 4.5 months). The interest rate increases
from 3.38% to 3.51%, and the growth rate of the economy rises from 1.96% to 2.01%. More-
over, under regime (b) individuals benefit from an improvement in the healthcare technology:
Expected lifetime utility increases by 4.86%.
Second, we compare regimes (a) and (b). We find that expected lifetime utility levels are
higher under regime (b) with conditioned annuity claims. Individuals under regime (a) would
have to enjoy a 1.29% (1.58%) higher consumption level throughout their entire lifetime in
scenario (i) ((ii)) to reach the expected lifetime utility under regime (b). To understand how
conditioned annuity claims affect the expected lifetime utility, we first write expected lifetime
utility in the steady state as follows (see also Appendix A.9):
U(s) =
σ
σ − 1
c(s, h¯, p¯)
σ−1
σ
1
x¯(h¯, p¯)
, (22)
where x¯(h¯, p¯) denotes the propensity to consume in the steady-state equilibrium and c(s, h¯, p¯)
is a household’s consumption at birth, which is given by
c(s, h¯, p¯) =W (s, h¯, p¯)x¯(h¯, p¯)(1− h¯) . (23)
25Recall that according to our metric, an increase of 4.55% means that we had to give an individual in scenario
(i) a consumption increase of 4.55% over the entire lifetime to enjoy the same expected lifetime utility as an
individual in scenario (ii).
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Differentiating with respect to the steady-state healthcare expenditures h¯ yields the following:
dU(s)
dh¯
= U(s)
{
σ − 1
σ
[
−
1
1− h¯
+
dx¯(h¯, p¯)/dh¯
x¯(h¯, p¯)
+
dW (s, h¯, p¯)/dh¯
W (s, h¯, p¯)
]
−
dx¯(h¯, p¯)/dh¯
x¯(h¯, p¯)
}
. (24)
Thus, changes in steady-state healthcare spending h¯ affect utility either via a change in the
growth rate of individual consumption (last term) or via the initial consumption level at birth
(first three terms), which itself depends on the direct costs and benefits of healthcare expen-
ditures (first and second terms in brackets) and changes in the net present value of lifetime
earnings W (s, h¯, p¯) (third term in brackets).
We further decompose the difference in expected lifetime utility into three components. The
first component ∆Udirect consists of all changes in expected lifetime utility on the microeconomic
level of the individual due to a direct change in healthcare spending h¯ or a corresponding change
in the mortality rate p¯. Thus, ∆Udirect is the difference in expected lifetime utilities due to
switching from regime (a) to regime (b) if the individual’s h¯ changes from 6.1% (8.7%) to 5.54%
(8.04%) and, as a consequence, the life expectancy decreases from 73.1 (79.8) to 72.83 (79.02)
years but the wage, interest rate and the growth rate of the economy remain at regime (a)
values. The second component ∆Uequil isolates the effect of changes in the equilibrium wage
rate and interest rate but leaves the healthcare spending, the expected lifetime and the economy’s
growth rate at the levels of regime (a). The last component ∆Ugrowth elicits the difference in
expected lifetime utilities that stems from the change in the economy’s growth rate while leaving
healthcare spending, life expectancy and wage and interest rates unchanged.26
We find that the direct effect at the individual household level of a change from the annuity
regime (a) to regime (b) is positive. This is to be expected, as regime (b) eliminates the moral
hazard incentive for individual households to over-invest in healthcare because they do not take
into account the repercussions of higher healthcare spending, respectively higher life expectancy,
on the equilibrium annuity rate. This effect is well understood and documented in the literature
(see, e.g., Philipson and Becker, 1998). Yet, we find that this direct effect at the individual
household level is very small (0.011% in scenario (i) and 0.013% in scenario (ii)).
The isolated effect on the wage and interest rate ∆Uequil is negative. This implies that with
respect to wage and interest rates, households are better off under regime (a) with moral hazard
than under regime (b) without moral hazard. The reason is that the wage rate increases with
increasing healthcare spending, while the interest rate decreases (see Proposition 3 (i)). This
leads to a higher net present value of lifetime earnings. In Appendix A.9, we show that the
effect on the initial consumption level at birth, as given by equation (23), is unambiguously
positive. However, the propensity to consume x¯(h¯, p¯) increases, and thus, the total effect on
lifetime utility, as given by equation (22), is ambiguous. Over the whole range of our sensitivity
analyses, we find that the positive effect on initial consumption outweighs the negative effect on
26Note that the decomposition of the total effect is somewhat arbitrary. We select this particular (hypothetical)
decomposition to clearly distinguish among the different channels by which increased longevity impacts expected
lifetime utility and to clearly identify the magnitude of each of these channels. Obviously, other decompositions
of the different channels, for example incremental or hierarchical decompositions, are conceivable.
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the growth rate of individual consumption, rendering the total effect of an increase in healthcare
spending on lifetime utility positive. As healthcare investments are lower in regime (b), this
leads to the observed decrease in expected lifetime utility of −0.22% in scenario (i) and −0.27%
in scenario (ii).
Finally, a change in healthcare expenditures also affects the growth rate of the economy.
According to Proposition 3 (iii), an increase in h¯ leads to an increase in the growth rate for
small values and to a decrease for high values of h¯. ∆Ugrowth isolates the impact of a change
in the growth rate on expected lifetime utility. We find that in both scenarios a switch from
regime (a) to regime (b) reduces healthcare expenditures and increases the economy’s growth
rate. Accordingly, we observe an increase in expected lifetime utility of 1.50% in scenario (i)
and 1.84% in scenario (ii). In fact, for both scenarios and throughout the whole range of our
sensitivity analyses, we find that an increase in healthcare expenditures leads to a decrease in
the growth rate and an according expected utility loss by reducing the net present value of
lifetime income.
To check the qualitative and quantitative robustness of our reference simulation, we perform
a series of sensitivity analyses, the results of which we discuss in detail in Appendix A.9. We find
clear evidence that the moral hazard incentives of unconditioned annuity claims have a sizable
effect on individual expected lifetime utility. Throughout the parameter range of our sensitivity
analyses, we find that expected lifetime utility would increase by approximately between 1–3%
if annuity claims could be conditioned on healthcare expenditures. Interestingly, the direct
microeconomic effect of moral hazard in our model is rather small. In fact, the negative effect of
moral hazard is predominated by a macroeconomic repercussion of healthcare expenditures on
the economy’s growth rate. In addition, we find that the negative effect of moral hazard is larger
under a healthcare technology that resembles the average OECD country in 2005 compared to
a healthcare technology consistent with the average OECD country in 1985. Thus, if healthcare
technology continues improving, the negative effect of moral hazard due to unconditioned annuity
claims may increase further in the future.
8 Discussion
In the following, we relate our model framework and the obtained results to the real world.
First, the most important argument for the relevance of our analysis stems from the prevalence
of unconditioned annuity claims throughout the developed world. In fact, the typical pension
system within OECD countries rests on three pillars: The first pillar is a public pension sys-
tem, the second is a funded system that recipients and employers pay into, and the third is
voluntary privately funded accounts. Typically, the first two pillars comprise mandatory an-
nuities. According to OECD data (OECD, 2015b), in 2011 public pension expenditures in the
OECD amounted on average to approximately 10% of GDP and to 18% of total government
spending. Between 1990 and 2011, the increase in public pension expenditures outpaced the
increase in GDP by 28%. Furthermore, in 2014, mandatory social insurance contributions and
mandatory private pension contribution rates for employees and employers for a private sector
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worker earning the average wage were approximately 20% (OECD, 2015b).
Rusconi (2008) provides an overview of the annuity markets and pension systems across
OECD countries and classifies countries into two categories: (i) ‘life-long annuity predominated’
versus (ii) those predominated by ‘alternative forms of income’. While a number of countries,
such as Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and Italy, predominantly employ life-long annuities,
some countries, such as the U.S., use predominantly ‘alternative forms of income’. Nevertheless,
even in the U.S., the average fraction of retirement wealth that is annuitized is approximately
50% for individuals older than 60 years, as reported in Hosseini (2015).
Depending on the country, the types of annuities in the pension system and those offered in
the private market can differ. The OECD categorizes them into immediate, deferred and other
annuities. Cannon and Tonks (2008) provide a good overview of different annuity types. In
essence, they all share the central characteristics captured by the actuarial notes we employ in
our analysis. Furthermore, the fair rate of return of the annuity depends on average individual
longevity, but annuity contracts do not typically condition on health factors: The overwhelming
share of annuitized wealth from the public pension system and mandatory second-pillar contri-
butions does not condition on the health status of the annuitant. There are so-called ‘enhanced
annuities’, which pay higher rates when a person has some particular health conditions or is a
regular smoker. However, they only play a marginal role in overall annuitized retirement wealth
and only condition on very specific health characteristics.
Second, in our model, we find that whether the moral-hazard effect in healthcare investments
leads to over- or under-investment depends on whether the expected additional consumption
exceeds the expected additional wealth for a marginal increase in the household’s life expectancy
due to increased healthcare investments. It is rather intuitive that a longer life implies financing
a stream of consumption over a longer time horizon. Yet, it is less obvious how it might lead
to higher expected labor income wealth, as in reality, the average person no longer works at
the age of average life expectancy of approximately 80 years. However, life-extending healthcare
measures not only play a role at the very end of life, but they also extend an individual’s expected
working life via three different channels: (i) later death during the regular working life, (ii) later
or no early retirement based on health issues and (iii) fewer unemployment spells due to poor
health. In fact, ill health was the most commonly cited reason for early retirement among both
men and women according to several studies 27 In addition to the expected extension of the
household’s working life, the expected additional labor income wealth also depends on the wage
rate. In our model, the positive spillover effect that health expenditures exert on consumption
good production and, ceteris paribus, leads to higher wages captures that a healthier workforce is
also more productive. In addition, the wage rate is affected by the growth rate of wages (which,
in steady state, is also the growth rate of the economy). As we have shown, the growth rate
of the economy is either positively or negatively affected by a marginal increase in healthcare
27See, for example, Disney et al., 2006 and the references therein. In addition, Dwyer and Mitchell (1999)
report that men in poor health are expected to retire one to two years earlier. Further evidence for substantial
effects of health on labor market participation are reported by Garcia-Gomez et al. (2010), van den Berg et al.
(2010) and Brown et al. (2010).
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investments, depending on the initial size of the healthcare sector.
Third, we have shown that in the steady-state equilibrium, the moral-hazard effect leads to
over-investment in healthcare relative to the case in which annuity rates are conditioned on health
status. A crucial assumption for this result is that either there is no spillover effect of health on
aggregate productivity or it is not internalized. We show in Appendix A.10 that if the spillover
effect is internalized, the moral-hazard effect may indeed lead to under-investment in healthcare.
Internalizing the spillover effect is essentially a wage subsidy conditioned on healthcare spending.
Households, anticipating this increase in wage associated with higher healthcare investments,
thus have an additional motive to increase healthcare expenditures. If this wage increase is
sufficiently large, then the increase in the wealth component in the budget constraint can be
strong enough to overcompensate for the additional consumption to be financed. Then, the
moral-hazard effect would lead to under-investment in healthcare.
To test the robustness of our over-investment result, we re-run our numerical simulation,
as detailed in Section 7 and Appendix A.9, with the only difference being that we internalize
the spillover effect of healthcare investments on consumption good production (see Appendix
A.10). We find that there is an additional incentive to invest in healthcare, yet it is rather
small. As a consequence, the result that households over-invest in healthcare remains robust
throughout the whole parameter range of our sensitivity analyses. In fact, healthcare investments
decrease slightly less when switching from regime (a) with unconditioned annuity claims to
regime (b) under which annuities are conditioned on healthcare spending, and compared to the
standard case without internalizing the spillovers of healthcare investments to consumption good
production, the welfare losses decrease from 1.29% to 1.23% in scenario (i) and from 1.58% to
1.42% in scenario (ii). In Appendix A.9, we also simulate the scenario in which both the
learning-by-investing externality and the health investment spillover are internalized. We find
that this substantially increases the size of the welfare losses associated with the moral-hazard
effect relative to the scenario in which neither of these two externalities are internalized.
Fourth, in our model, we assume that households inelastically supply one unit of labor as long
as they are alive. Thus, we abstract from a retirement phase at the end of a household’s lifetime.
How would the explicit consideration of a retirement phase change our results concerning under-
or over-investment in healthcare due to moral-hazard effects from unconditioned annuity claims?
As outlined above, over-investment occurs if the costs to finance consumption over a longer life
expectancy outweigh the increase in the net present value of expected lifetime labor income due
to a marginal increase in healthcare expenditures. While a retirement phase has little impact
on the need to finance consumption over a longer time horizon, it clearly limits the possibilities
for increases in lifetime labor income.28 As a consequence, we expect that, in reality, over-
investment in health is even larger than suggested by our model.29 Thus, we interpret the loss in
28Yet, it is certainly true that people in good health expecting to live longer might consider extending their
working life if doing so were to positively affect their wealth. In fact, Kuhn et al. (2015) examine the relationship
between the endogenous choices of healthcare and retirement age in a partial equilibrium analysis and find that
moral hazard due to unconditioned annuities leads to both excessive healthcare expenditures and an excessive
duration of the working life. In addition, the official retirement age might also increase with higher average life
expectancy.
29This is particularly true if pension systems rely on unconditioned annuity claims. Zhao (2014) shows in a
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expected lifetime utility due to moral hazard of 1–3%, as suggested by our numerical illustration
in Section 7, as a conservative estimate. To better estimate the size of the moral-hazard effect,
a quantitative exercise with richer detail on retirement and age-dependent mortality and health
status over the life-cycle would be a desirable next step.
Finally, we note that our general model framework and the solution to the households’
maximization problem for given prices and the social planner’s solution do include preference
specifications as suggested by Hall and Jones (2007). It is only with respect to the steady-state
equilibrium that we employ an intertemporal elasticity of substitution larger than one. With
an intertemporal elasticity of substitution smaller than one, the equilibrium dynamics would
change such that the healthcare sector would grow either to dominate the entire economy, with
consumption good production growing positively but more slowly, or to bring consumption
growth to a halt, leading to a stationary economy without growth. Similarly, we would obtain
equilibrium dynamics with an ever-growing healthcare sector if we included continuous tech-
nological improvements in healthcare (see, e.g., Jones, forthcoming). However, such changes
to our model will not negate the channels identified in this paper through which endogenous
healthcare expenditures affect the economy and the determinants of the sign and the size of the
moral-hazard effect from annuities unconditioned on individual household mortality but would
affect the dynamics of the economy and likely the quantitative results.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the role of households’ endogenous healthcare choices to extend their
expected lifetimes in economic growth and welfare in a decentralized, overlapping generations
economy with the realistic feature that households’ savings are held in annuities. While it is well
known that annuities that do not fully condition their returns on individual households’ health
statuses induce moral-hazard effects in health spending, how this effect plays out in general
equilibrium and the macroeconomic repercussions it implies for the economy’s growth prospects
have yet to be analyzed. This is the central focus of our analysis.
An increase in healthcare spending that causes households to live longer will reduce the
equilibrium return on annuities. We find that this lowers the discount rate in the household’s
budget constraint on future consumption and future labor income, the latter of which is typically
neglected in the literature. Another interpretation is that the increase in healthcare spending
implies, on the one hand, that additional consumption needs to be financed for the increase in
lifetime but, on the other hand, that additional income may also be earned during the additional
lifetime. Neglecting the effect of healthcare spending on annuity rates by taking the latter as
given leads households to over-invest in healthcare if the extra lifetime consumption exceeds the
extra lifetime income and vice versa. We show that households will over-invest in the steady-
state equilibrium. Under-investment may only occur if the health investment has an additional
quantitative general equilibrium neoclassical growth model calibrated to US data that one third of the increase
in US healthcare expenditures between 1950 and 2000 can be attributed to the increase in social securities over
the same time horizon.
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large and positive (side-)effect of increasing the households’ wage rates.
We further show that in macroeconomic terms, increased health investments boost economic
growth when the healthcare sector is small but curtail growth when the healthcare sector is
already sizable. The latter case additionally amplifies the neglect of the quality of life in terms
of consumption in favor of the quantity of life resulting from over-investment in healthcare, as
emphasized in the microeconomic literature. In fact, our simulations using OECD data suggest
that the growth effect of over-investment in healthcare is negative. Moreover, we find that
the welfare losses resulting from over-investment in healthcare are substantial and throughout
various scenarios between 1–3%. In particular, the numerical results highlight the importance of
the general equilibrium effects and, especially, the growth effects for the welfare impacts of the
moral-hazard effect. In addition, our simulations suggest that while technological improvements
in the healthcare sector involved large welfare gains over the last two decades with increases
of approximately 5%, they also tended to increase the welfare losses from moral hazard in
healthcare investments.
The policy implications that can be drawn from our analysis clearly indicate that attempts
should be made to condition annuity payments in social security systems to a far greater extent
on health status than is currently done. In practice this might be a difficult task in terms of
measurement, and it might also be a contentious issue politically. Yet, the rewards in the event
of success are sizable gains in expected lifetime utility.
This paper analyzes the complex interplay among endogenous longevity, endogenous eco-
nomic growth and welfare in a model that abstracts from various issues that deserve further
scrutiny. To be able to analytically investigate the aggregate economy, we employ a rather
simplistic household model. Interesting extensions in this direction include age-dependent mor-
tality, retirement decisions or endogenous fertility. At the level of the aggregate economy, we
have shown that the decentralized market solution exhibits several externalities that call for gov-
ernment action. Augmenting the model with realistic features of national health systems would
allow future researchers to examine their effects on growth and welfare and to evaluate poten-
tial policy interventions. Finally, we only considered exogenous improvements in the healthcare
technology. Endogenizing these improvements is a further challenge for future research.
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Appendix
A.1 Households’ utility maximization problems
In this section we derive the households’ necessary conditions for an optimum and show that
they are also sufficient. We first derive the household’s forward budget constraint and then use
it to establish the first-order conditions. Finally, we show that the first-order conditions are also
sufficient in the steady state.
Integrating the flow budget constraint (5) with respect to t and using the initial condition
b(s, s) = 0 and the transversality condition limt→∞ b(t, s) exp[−
∫ t
s a(t
′, s)dt′] = 0, we obtain the
household’s forward budget constraint:
b(t, s) =
∫ ∞
t
[
c(t′, s)−
(
1− h(s)
)
w(t′)
]
exp
[
−
∫ t′
t
a(t′′, s)dt′′
]
dt′ . (A.1)
Then, we can write the household’s problem as
max
{c(t,s)}ts,h(s)
∫ ∞
s
V (c(t, s)) exp[−(ρ+ p(s))(t− s)]dt
s.t. b(s, s) =
∫ ∞
s
[c(t, s)− (1− h(s))w(t)] exp
[
−
∫ t
s
a(t′, s)dt′
]
dt .
As b(s, s) = 0, we can set-up the Lagrangian
L =
∫ ∞
s
V (c(t, s)) exp[−(ρ+ p(s))(t− s)]
− λ[c(t, s) − (1− h(s))w(t)] exp
[
−
∫ t
s
a(t′, s)dt′
]
dt .
(A.2)
Taking the (Volterra) derivative with respect to c(t, s), equating it with zero and solving for the
Lagrange multiplier yields:
λ = V ′(c(t, s)) exp
[ ∫ t
s
a(t′, s)dt′ − (ρ+ p(s))(t− s)
]
. (A.3)
Then, taking the derivative with respect to t of the logarithm of both sides of (A.3) yields the
Euler equation, as shown in equation (7).
When the households take the annuity rate a(t, s) as given, the derivative of the Lagrangian
with respect to h(s) together with equation (A.3) yields the first-order condition with re-
spect to healthcare investments (8). In the case where annuity contracts are conditioned on
healthcare investments, the households additionally consider the change in the annuity rate
a(t, s) = r(t)+p(s) when deciding on their healthcare levels. In this case the respective derivative
of the Lagrangian combined with (A.3) gives the first-order condition for healthcare investments
presented in equation (19).
The first-order conditions are not only necessary but also sufficient for an interior household
optimum in the steady state. In case of annuity claims that are conditioned on healthcare
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expenditures the Lagrangian (A.2) is jointly concave in c(t, s) and h(s) in the steady state
whenever the first-order conditions hold. As a consequence, any local extremum is a local
maximum. As the Lagrangian is continuously differentiable this implies that there is only one
local maximum, and, as corner solutions cannot be optimal, the local maximum is also the global
maximum.
In case of unconditioned annuity claims we interpret the household problem as a two-step
maximization problem. In the first step, we seek the optimal consumption paths in the steady
state for a given healthcare expenditure h¯. In the second step, we insert the optimal consumption
paths in the household’s lifetime utility function and maximize with respect to healthcare ex-
penditures h¯. Given the utility function (11), the Euler equation characterizing the household’s
optimal consumption path (7) reads
c˙(t, s)
c(t, s)
= σ
[
a¯(h¯, p¯)− ρ− p¯
]
, t ≥ s . (A.4)
For given h¯, saving and consumption by a household born at time s is uniquely characterized
by the system of differential equations (6) and (A.4), the initial condition b(s, s) = 0 and the
transversality condition for the stock of assets limt→∞ b(t, s) exp
[
−a¯(h¯, p¯)(t− s)
]
= 0. Under the
assumptions that the propensity to consume out of wealth x(h¯, p¯) = (1−σ)a¯(h¯, p¯)+σ
(
ρ+ p¯
)
> 0
and the long-run growth rate of wages w¯(h¯, t) is smaller than a¯(h¯, p¯),30 we obtain for the optimal
paths of consumption c(t, s, h¯, p¯) and assets b(t, s, h¯, p¯)
c(t, s, h¯, p¯) = c(s, h¯, p¯) exp
[
σ
(
a¯(h¯, p¯)− ρ− p¯
)
(t− s)
]
, (A.5a)
b(t, s, h¯, p¯) =
c(t, s, h¯, p¯)
x(h¯, p¯)
−
(
1− h¯
)
W (t, h¯, p¯) , (A.5b)
c(s, h¯, p¯) = x(h¯, p¯)
(
1− h¯
)
W (s, h¯, p¯) . (A.5c)
where W (t, h¯, p¯) ≡
∫∞
t w¯(h¯, t
′) exp
[
−a¯(h¯, p¯)(t′ − t)
]
dt′ = w¯(h¯, t)/y(h¯, p¯) denotes the expected
net present value of the household’s future labor income at time t. As in steady state the
wage rate grows at a constant rate g¯(h¯, p¯), we can write W (t, h¯, p¯) = w¯(h¯, t)/y(h¯, p¯), where
y(h¯, p¯) = a¯(h¯, p¯)− g¯(h¯, p¯). Inserting the optimal consumption path into the household’s lifetime
utility function (4) and differentiating with respect to healthcare spending h(s) yields:
FOC
(
h¯
)
≡ −
c(s, h¯, p¯)1−
1
σ
x(h¯, p¯)
[
σ
σ − 1
H ′
(
h¯
)
x(h¯, p¯)
+
1
1− h¯
]
. (A.6)
Then, the necessary condition for an interior household optimum is given by FOC
(
h¯
)
= 0. Note
that the corner solutions h¯ = 1 and h¯ = 0 cannot be optimal solutions. For h¯ = 1, consumption
and lifetime utility would drop to zero, while both are positive for any value h¯ ∈ [0, 1). Regarding
the corner solution h¯ = 0, we recall that H ′(h¯) = −βψh¯β−1 which will approach infinity when
30If these assumptions do not hold, the household’s problem is not well defined. We shall see in Section A.4 that
the condition that the long-run growth rate of wages w¯(h¯, t) is smaller than a¯(h¯, p¯) always holds in the market
equilibrium.
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h¯ → 0. Thus, the benefits of a marginal investment in healthcare diverges while the costs in
terms of lifetime utility stay finite. Hence only interior solutions h¯ ∈ (0, 1) can be optimal.
Taking the limits of FOC
(
h¯
)
for h¯→ 0 and h¯→ 1, we obtain:
lim
h¯→0
FOC
(
h¯
)
= +∞ , lim
h¯→1
FOC
(
h¯
)
= −∞ . (A.7)
As FOC
(
h¯) is continuously differentiable on h¯ ∈ [0, 1], there exists at least one h¯, which is
also a local maximum, that satisfies FOC
(
h¯
)
= 0. However, there may be any odd number of
h(s) ∈ [0, 1] that satisfy the first-order condition. To show that there exists a unique solution
to FOC
(
h¯
)
= 0 and, thus, the first-order condition is also sufficient for a household optimum,
we re-arrange it to yield:
ψ[1 + h(s)(β + σ − 1)] =
σ
σ − 1
xmaxh(s)
1−β , (A.8)
where xmax = (1−σ)a¯(h¯, p¯)+σ(ρ+pmax) is the propensity to consume in case h¯ = 0. Thus, the
first-order condition requires the intersection of a linear function with a power function, which
can only have zero, one or two solutions h¯ ∈ [0, 1]. As we already know that FOC
(
h¯
)
= 0 can
only have an odd number of solutions, this implies that FOC
(
h¯
)
= 0 has a unique solution,
which is also local maximum and, because corner solution cannot be optimal, is also the global
maximum.
A.2 Social planner’s welfare maximization problem
We consider a social planner that maximizes the welfare of all generations alive from time 0 to
infinity. V(t) reflects aggregate welfare at time t and comprises the utilities of all persons alive
at this time. The planner discounts the different generations’ utilities with the rate ρs which we
assume to be equal to the households’ pure time preference rates ρ.31
max
{{c(t,s)}∞t=0,h(s)}
∞
s=0
∫ ∞
0
V(t)dt,
where V(t) =
∫ t
−∞
V
(
c(t, s)
)
exp
[
−
(
ρ+ p(s)
)
(t− s)
]
exp[νs] exp[−ρss]ds,
s.t. p(s) = H
(
h(s)
)
,
N(t) =
∫ t
−∞
exp[νs− p(s)(t− s)]ds,
LH(t) =
∫ t
−∞
h(s) exp[νs− p(s)(t− s)]ds,
N(t) = LF (t) + LH(t),
K˙(t) = F (K(t), LF (t), LH(t)) − δK(t) − C(t),
31See, for example, Schneider et al. (2012) for a detailed discussion on the role of the relation of the households’
time preference rates and the generational discount rate of the social planner.
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C(t) =
∫ t
−∞
c(t, s) exp[νs− p(s)(t− s)]ds,
together with the initial conditions {h(s)}0−∞ and K(0) = K0 > 0.
In our context the planner’s welfare maximization problem bears some particular difficulties
that do not allow to use the standard set of tools from optimal control theory directly.32 The first
difficulty is that we have a double integral in the objective function: one integrating over time
t and another over the households’ birth-dates s. Second, we have integral constraints in the
maximization problem that cannot be transformed into constraints without integrals via taking
derivatives. The latter is mostly due to the assumption that healthcare investment decisions
have to be taken at the beginning of an individual’s life and adhered to throughout lifetime.
With respect to the double integral in the objective function, we can perceive the problem as
one with two parts.33 One part, the “inner problem”, is concerned with maximizing welfare at
each point in time t by choosing the intratemporal distribution of consumption c(t, s) across the
different cohorts of size N(t, s) taking as given aggregate consumption C(t) and the cohort sizes.
The other part, the “outer problem”, uses the optimal intratemporal distribution of consumption
from the solution to the inner problem and determines the paths of aggregate consumption C(t),
aggregate capital K(t) and the healthcare levels of the generations born at time t, and therefore
the path of each cohort’s size.
Using the definition of N(t, s) = exp[νs − p(s)(t − s)], we can re-write the social planner’s
objective function
∫ ∞
0
∫ t
−∞
V
(
c(t, s)
)
N(t, s) exp[(ρ− ρs)s] ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
objective of inner problem
exp[−ρt] dt. (A.9)
We observe that the social planner’s weight on the different generations’ consumption at any
time t, depends on the sizes of the generations and the difference between the households’ time
preference rate, ρ, and the generational weight of the social planner, ρs. As mentioned previously,
we assume that ρs = ρ. In this case, the social planner optimally distributes consumption equally
among all households alive in each period, i.e. c(t, s) = c¯(t) ∀s ≤ t. A proof of this result will
be provided upon request and can also be found – together with a general discussion of optimal
intratemporal consumption profiles including the cases ρs = ρ – in Schneider et al. (2012).
With this result of the inner problem, we now turn to the outer problem with the difficulty
that the integrals in the constraints cannot be eliminated. The outer problem can be written as
follows:
max
{{C(t)}∞t=0,h(s)}
∞
s=0
∫ ∞
0
V
(
c¯(t)
)
N(t) exp[−ρt] dt
32Our approach to the problem is based on chapter 22 in Kamien and Schwartz (1991) and chapters 7.3 and
9.1 in Chiang (1992).
33This split is typically used in welfare analysis of continuous-time overlapping generations models (see, e.g.,
Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) or Schneider et al. (2012)).
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s.t. p(s) = H
(
h(s)
)
,
N(t) = N0(t) +
∫ t
0
exp[νs− p(s)(t− s)]ds,
LH(t) = LH0 (t) +
∫ t
0
h(s) exp[νs− p(s)(t− s)]ds,
N(t) = LF (t) + LH(t),
K(t) = K(0) +
∫ t
0
F (K(sˆ), LF (sˆ), LH(sˆ))− δK(sˆ)− C(sˆ) dsˆ,
C(t) = c¯(t)N(t).
This problem differs from the initial statement of the planner’s problem in two respects.
First, we have included the solution to the inner maximization problem and we have written the
constraints on the stock variables to isolate the part fixed by the initial conditions from the one
that can be influenced by the control variables. Note that N0(t) is the number of households
born before time 0 and still alive at time t. These cohort sizes cannot be influenced by the
planners control {h(s)}∞0 but are given via the initial condition {h(s)}
0
−∞. Similarly for L
H
0 ,
which characterizes the labor demand in healthcare by the individuals born before time 0.
We can now set up the Lagrangian:
Ls =
∫ ∞
0
V
(
C(t)
N(t)
)
N(t) exp[−ρt]dt
+
∫ ∞
0
ϕ(t)
[
N0(t)−N(t) +
∫ t
0
exp[νs− p(s)(t− s)]ds
]
dt
+
∫ ∞
0
µ(t)
[
LH0 (t)− L
H(t) +
∫ t
0
h(s) exp[νs− p(s)(t− s)]ds
]
dt
+
∫ ∞
0
γ(t)
[
LF (t) + LH(t)−N(t)
]
dt
+
∫ ∞
0
ξ(t)
[
K(0)−K(t) +
∫ t
0
F (K(sˆ), LF (sˆ), LH(sˆ))− δK(sˆ)− C(sˆ) dsˆ
]
dt
The constraints in the Lagrangian, for example the one with µ as the Lagrangian multiplier,
comprise a double integral that sums the healthcare labor employed at time t to satisfy the
healthcare demand of all generations born after time 0 to time t. The outer integral sums the
healthcare labor demand in each period t, weighted by the shadow price for healthcare labor,
over the social planner’s planning horizon from 0 to infinity. However, by the assumption that
healthcare levels are decided upon at the beginning of life and fixed at this level from then
onwards, the planner is less concerned about the aggregate healthcare labor costs at time t but
rather about the entire healthcare labor costs of fixing a certain healthcare level at time t for
the generation born at this point in time. To obtain these healthcare costs incurred by the
generation born in t, we can exchange the order of integration in the respective constraints.
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This allows us to re-write the Lagrangian as follows:
Ls = lim
T→∞
∫ T
0
H
(
C(t), h(t),K(t), N(t), LH (t), LF (t)
)
+ ϕ(t) [N0(t)−N(t)] + µ(t) [L
H
0 (t)− L
H(t)] + γ(t)
[
LF (t) + LH(t)−N(t)
]
+ ξ(t) [K(0) −K(t)] dt
where
H
(
C(t), h(t),K(t), N(t), LH (t), LF (t)
)
=
V
(
C(t)
N(t)
)
N(t) exp[−ρt] +
∫ ∞
t
ϕ(s)N(s, t) ds +
∫ ∞
t
µ(s)h(t)N(s, t) ds
+
∫ ∞
t
ξ(s)
[
F (K(t), LF (t), LH(t))− δK(t)− C(t)
]
ds .
We now approach the planner’s problem with the tools from the calculus of variations,
seeking the optimal paths of the variables h(t), C(t),K(t), N(t), LH (t) and LF (t). We indicate
the optimal paths by a star and define the perturbations from the optimal paths by z(t) =
z(t) + ε oz(t). In this definition, z stands for the respective variable and oz is an arbitrary
function. For example, C(t) = C(t) + ε oC(t) and similarly for the other control and state
variables. In particular, we also define T = T +ε∆T , which we need to derive the transversality
conditions.34 Both of our control variables C(t) and h(t) are bounded from below, as they must
be non-negative.35 However, corner solutions in the sense that C(t) = 0 or h(t) = 0 for at
least some t ∈ [0,∞) cannot be optimal, as both marginal instantaneous utility and marginal
healthcare productivity diverge for C(t)→ 0, respectively h(t)→ 0. As a consequence, we know
that the social planner’s optimum must satisfy the condition ∂Ls(ε)/∂ε = 0. Combined with
some mathematical transformations, this yields the necessary conditions for a welfare maximum
as depicted in equations (15) and (17).
We obtain the transversality conditions from the terms generated via the derivative of T
with respect to ε:
lim
T→∞
H(T ) = 0, lim
T→∞
ϕ(T )N(T ) = 0, lim
T→∞
µ(T )LH(T ) = 0, lim
T→∞
ξ(T )K(T ) = 0 .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof comprises two steps: First we show that given a fixed level of healthcare spending of
all households, h¯, there is a unique equilibrium allocation supported by the prices stated in the
proposition. Second, given these prices there exists a unique optimal choice of h¯ ∈ (0, 1) by the
34See, for example, Chiang (1992).
35Note that in the social planner problem h(t), which indicates the healthcare spending of the cohort born at
time t, is not bounded from above. In fact, as the social planner equally distributes aggregate consumption among
all households alive, it is feasible to choose h(t) > 1 at least for some t ∈ [0,∞). However, aggregate healthcare
spending
∫ t
−∞
h(s)N(t, s)ds must not exceed aggregate wage income w(t)N(t). We do not have to explicitly check
for this condition, as this would imply aggregate consumption to go to zero, which cannot be optimal because
Inada conditions hold for the instantaneous utility function (11).
38
households.
Uniqueness of equilibrium prices given uniform healthcare investments
Assume that all households invest a share h¯ of their labor income in healthcare. Then,
the labor demand in the healthcare sector amounts to LH(t) = h¯
∫ t
−∞N(t, s) ds = h¯N(t).
According to the labor market clearing condition, the supply of labor for consumption-good
production is given by LF (t) =
(
1 − h¯
)
N(t). This supply will only match the demand of
the consumption-good production firms for the equilibrium wage rate given in Proposition 1,
which reflects the marginal productivity of labor in consumption-good production at the point(
LF (t), LH(t)
)
=
(
(1− h¯)N(t), h¯N(t)
)
.
With the unique split of labor between healthcare and consumption-good production, the
marginal return on capital is then given by the interest rate, as stated in the Proposition.
This expression can be derived from evaluating equation (2a) at the point
(
LF (t), LH(t)
)
=(
(1− h¯)N(t), h¯N(t)
)
.
Next, we turn to the equilibrium in the annuity market. With all households choosing
healthcare level h¯, their hazard rate of dying will be p¯ = H(h¯). This implies that N˙(t, s) =
−p¯N(t, s). Using this together with the constant interest rate r¯(h¯), as established previously,
we can re-write the market clearing condition in the insurance market as
∫ t
−∞
a(t, s)b(t, s)N(t, s)ds =
∫ t
−∞
(r¯(h¯) + p¯)b(t, s)N(t, s)ds. (A.10)
It follows directly that the unique steady-state equilibrium annuity rate must be a¯(h¯, p¯) =
r¯(h¯) + p¯.
Finally, by virtue of Walras’ law, also the consumption good market must clear given all
other market clear. As already noted in the main text, we choose the consumption good as
the numeraire. Consequently, for any given h¯ ∈ (0, 1) we obtain a unique market equilibrium
supported by the prices provided in items 2–4 of Proposition 1.
Uniqueness of healthcare investments given equilibrium prices
We will now show that there is a unique household choice h¯ given the previously derived
equilibrium prices. Inserting the household’s optimal consumption and saving paths as described
by equations (A.5) into the necessary condition with respect to healthcare investments (8), we
obtain the expression (12) in Proposition 1. As already discussed in Appendix A.1, the corner
solutions h¯ = 1 and h¯ = 0 cannot be optimal solutions. As only an interior solution is possible,
we can re-arrange (12) to yield
G(h¯) :=
σ
1− σ
H ′(h¯)(1− h¯)− x(h¯,H(h¯)) = 0. (A.11)
Note that regarding the second argument of x we used the definition p¯ = H(h¯). We will now
show that G(h¯) is strictly decreasing in its argument, implying that there must be a unique h¯
satisfying G(h¯) = 0.
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When taking the derivative G(h¯) with respect to h¯, we obtain
dG(h¯)
dh¯
=
σ
1− σ
H ′′(h¯)(1− h¯)−
σ
1− σ
H ′(h¯)− (1− σ)
dr¯(h¯)
dh¯
−H ′(h¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
dx(h¯,H(h¯))/dh¯
. (A.12)
The last summand in (A.12), −H ′(h¯) is the only one that is positive. However, since σ > 1 by
assumption, it is smaller in magnitude than the second summand − σ1−σH
′(h¯) and consequently,
we obtain dG(h¯)
dh¯
< 0. Therefore, there is a unique healthcare investment level h¯ which maximizes
the households utilities given the equilibrium prices as derived previously.

A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
In this section we will show that with the unique equilibrium prices and healthcare choices
derived in the Proof of Proposition 1, the economy’s steady state dynamics are governed by
a unique balanced-growth path where aggregate consumption per capita and aggregate capital
per capita grow at the same constant rate.
(i) Aggregate dynamics: To derive the aggregate system dynamics, we evaluate equation
(A.5b) in the market equilibrium, aggregate according to equation (9) and differentiate with
respect to t:
c˙(t) = x(h¯, p¯)
[
k˙(t) + (1− h¯)W˙ (t, h¯, p¯)
]
. (A.13)
Recall that W (t, h¯, p¯) =
∫∞
t w¯(h¯, t
′) exp[−(r¯(h¯) + p¯)(t′ − t)] dt′ denotes the net present value of
the household’s future lifetime labor income in the steady-state equilibrium at time t. Evaluating
the budget constraint in the market equilibrium and aggregating according to equation (9), we
obtain
b˙(t) =
[
r
(
h¯
)
− ν
]
b(t) + (1− h¯)w¯(h¯, t)− c(t) . (A.14)
Inserting W˙ (t, h¯, p¯) and equation (A.14) into equation (A.13) yields equation (13a). We derive
(13b) by inserting the equilibrium wage rate given in Proposition 1 into equation (A.14).
(ii) Balanced growth path: By contradiction, we prove that the dynamics of the economy is
governed by a unique balanced-growth path (BGP) given a fixed healthcare level h¯ implying a
constant hazard rate p¯.
We start by asserting two facts: First, there is a unique economically feasible ratio c(t)/k(t)
such that c˙(t)/c(t) ≡ gc(t) = gk(t) ≡ k˙(t)/k(t). This follows from solving the equations of
motion for c(t)/k(t) given that gc(t) = gk(t). As x(h¯, p¯)(p¯ + ν) > 0 for all p¯ > 0, there is only
one economically feasible solution (with c(t)/k(t) > 0)
c(t)
k(t)
= ζ ≡
1
2
{
r¯(h¯)
α
+
1− α
α
δ − ν − σ
[
r¯(h¯)− ρ
]}
+
1
2
√{
r¯(h¯)
α
+
1− α
α
δ − ν − σ
[
r¯(h¯)− ρ
]}2
+ 4x(h¯, p¯)(p¯+ ν) .
(A.15)
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Second, we observe in equations (13a) and (13b) that gc(t) is increasing in c(t)/k(t) while gk(t)
is decreasing in c(t)/k(t).
Now suppose that gc(t) > gk(t). According to the two facts above, this can only hold if
c(t)/k(t) > ζ. The condition gc(t) > gk(t) then implies that c(t)/k(t) further increases which in
turn will increase the future gap between gc and gk, leading to limt→∞ gk(t) = −∞. By the same
line of argument, the economy’s dynamics imply for gk(t) > gc(t) that limt→∞ gc(t) = −∞. As
both cases yield economically infeasible solutions the only remaining possibility is gc(t) = gk(t)
implying c(t)/k(t) = ζ. Since the latter ratio does not depend on time t and is unique, the
economy must be on a unique BGP gc(t) = gk(t) at all times. The BGP growth rate can be
calculated by inserting (A.15) into gk(t) =
r¯(h¯)
α +
1−α
α δ − ν − c(t)/k(t):
g¯(h¯, p¯) =
1
2
{
r¯(h¯)
α
+
1− α
α
δ − ν + σ
[
r¯(h¯)− ρ
]}
−
1
2
√{
r¯(h¯)
α
+
1− α
α
δ − ν − σ
[
r¯(h¯)− ρ
]}2
+ 4x(h¯, p¯)(p¯ + ν) .
(A.16)
After some minor manipulations, we obtain that the growth rate on the BGP, g¯(h¯, p¯), is positive
if and only if x(h¯, p¯)(p¯+ν) < σ(r¯(h¯)−ρ)
( r¯(h¯)
α +
1−α
α δ−ν
)
. Consequently, g¯(h¯, p¯) < 0 if x(h¯, p¯)(p¯+
ν) > σ(r(h¯)−ρ)
( r¯(h¯)
α +
1−α
α δ−ν
)
and g¯(h¯, p¯) = 0 if x(h¯, p¯)(p¯+ν) = σ(r¯(h¯)−ρ)
( r¯(h¯)
α +
1−α
α δ−ν
)
.

A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
(i) Taking the derivative of the equilibrium interest rate yields
d r¯(h¯)
d h¯
= α(1− α)
[
1− h¯
1− ηh¯
]−α
η − 1
(1− ηh¯)2
< 0 . (A.17)
Differentiating the equilibrium wage rate with respect to h¯, we obtain
d w¯(h¯, t)
d h¯
= w(h¯, t)
[
α(1− ηh¯) + (1− α)(1 − h¯)η
(1− ηh¯)(1 − h¯)
]
> 0 . (A.18)
(ii) Aiming for concise yet clear notation, in the next two paragraphs we highlight the
growth rates’ dependence on the interest rate and on longevity while not explicitly indicating
their dependence on h¯. We can then re-write the steady state growth rate in the form
g¯(r¯, p¯) = z(r¯)−
√
z(r¯)2 +m(r¯, p¯) + ghh(r¯) ,
where z(r¯) = 12
(
r¯
α +
1−α
α δ − ν − ghh(r¯)
)
, m(r¯, p¯) = x(r¯)(p¯ + ν) and ghh(r¯) = σ(r¯ − ρ).
Taking the derivative with respect to r¯, we obtain
d g¯(r¯, p¯)
d r¯
=
∂g¯(r¯, p¯)
∂z(r¯)
d z(r¯)
d r¯
+
∂g¯(r¯, p¯)
∂m(r¯, p¯)
dm(r¯)
d r¯
+
d ghh
d r¯
, (A.19)
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where
∂g¯(r¯, p¯)
∂z(r¯)
= 1−
z(r¯)√
z(r¯)2 +m(r¯, p¯)
> 0 ,
d z(r¯)
d r¯
=
1
2
(
1
α
− σ
)
> 0 if α < 1/σ ,
∂g¯(r¯, p¯)
∂m(r¯, p¯)
= −
1√
z(r¯)2 +m(r¯, p¯)
< 0 ,
dm(r¯, p¯)
d r¯
= (1− σ)(p¯ + ν) < 0 ,
d ghh(r¯)
d r¯
= σ > 0 .
Note that if z(r¯) > 0, the condition for ∂g¯(r¯,p¯)∂z(r¯) > 0 reduces to m(r¯, p¯) > 0, which must be the
case as x > 0. From the signs of the different terms in d g¯(r¯,p¯)d r¯ , together with the assumption
α < 1σ , it follows that the steady state growth rate of the economy increases with the interest
rate.
According to the previous paragraph, we obtain
d
(
ghh(r¯)− g¯(r¯, p¯)
)
d r¯
= −
∂g¯(r¯, p¯)
∂z(r¯)
d z(r¯)
d r¯
−
∂g¯(r¯, p¯)
∂m(r¯, p¯)
dm(r¯, p¯)
d r¯
. (A.20)
By virtue of the signs of the different derivatives, as derived above, we conclude that d (ghh(r¯)−g¯(r¯,p¯))d r¯ <
0.
(iii) For the direct effect of increased healthcare investments via higher life expectancy, which
implies lower p¯, we obtain
∂g¯(r¯, p¯)
∂m(r¯, p¯)
dm(r¯, p¯)
d p¯
d p¯
d h¯
> 0 , (A.21)
as
∂g¯(r¯, p¯)
∂m(r¯, p¯)
d m(r¯, p¯)
d p¯
= −
1√
z(r¯)2 +m(r¯, p¯)
(
(ν + p¯) + x(r¯, p¯)
)
< 0 ,
d p¯
d h¯
=
dH(h¯)
d h¯
= −βψh¯β−1 < 0 .
With respect to the indirect effect via the equilibrium interest rate, we know from (i) that d r¯
d h¯
< 0
and from (ii) that d g¯(r¯,p¯)d r¯ > 0. Consequently, the indirect effect of an increasing healthcare sector
on economic growth must be negative.
Inspecting the derivatives of p¯ and r¯ with respect to h¯,
d p¯
d h¯
=
dH(h¯)
d h¯
= −βψh¯β−1 < 0 ,
d r¯(h¯)
d h¯
= α(1 − α)
[
1− h¯
1− ηh¯
]−α
η − 1
(1− ηh¯)2
< 0 ,
we find that limh¯→0
d p¯
d h¯
= −∞ and limh¯→1
d p¯
d h¯
< 0 but finite. By contrast, limh¯→0
d r¯(h¯)
d h¯
< 0 but
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finite and limh→1
d r¯(h¯)
d h¯
= −∞. The claim of the Proposition then follows from the limits h→ 0
and h → 1 of both dg¯(r¯,p¯)dp¯ and
dg¯(r¯,p¯)
dr¯ being finite. This is the case as p¯ and r¯(h¯) are finite and
consequently the expressions x(r¯, p¯), z(r¯) and m(r¯, p¯) must be finite, which implies that dg¯(r¯,p¯)dp¯
and dg¯(r¯,p¯)dr¯ are finite. 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Existence of the equilibrium will be shown as follows. First, for any given level of h < 1 we obtain
an equilibrium in the labor market, capital market, the annuity market and the market for the
consumption good with prices as given by Proposition 1. The equilibrium level of healthcare is
pinned down by equation (20). As shown in the Proof of Proposition 5, for every h the function
Gˆ(h) defined via (20),
Gˆ(h) =
σ
1− σ
H ′(h)
x(h,H(h))
−
1
(1− h)
+H ′(h)
(
1
x(h,H(h))
−
1
y(h,H(h))
)
must be strictly lower than the function G(h) representing the equilibrium condition on health-
care spending with unconditioned annuities,
G(h) =
σ
1− σ
H ′(h)
x(h,H(h))
−
1
(1− h)
.
We know from Proposition 1, that there is a unique h¯ satisfying G(h¯) = 0. At this h¯, we must
then have Gˆ(h¯) < 0. By continuity of Gˆ(h) and limh→0 Gˆ(h) → ∞, there exists a 0 < h˜ < h¯
satisfying Gˆ(h˜) = 0. Note that limh→0 Gˆ(h)→∞ follows from limh→0H
′(h)→ −∞ and
σ
1− σ
1
x(h,H(h))
+
1
x(h,H(h))
−
1
y(h,H(h))
< 0.
The interior solution h˜ constitutes a steady-state equilibrium in the economy with condi-
tioned annuities.
Multiplying Gˆ(h) = 0 by x(h,H(h)) and (1 − h), with h ∈ (0, 1), and taking the derivative
with respect to h yields
1
1− σ
H ′′(h)(1 − h)−
2− σ
1− σ
H ′(h)− (1− σ)
d r¯(h)
dh
−
(
H ′′(h)(1 − h)−H ′(h)
)x(h,H(h))
y(h,H(h))
−H ′(h)(1 − h)
d x(h,H(h))y(h,H(h))
dh
.
We obtain uniqueness of h˜ if above’s expression is negative. Given σ < 2, all summands are
negative except for the last one where the sign is determined by the sign of d x(h,H(h))y(h,H(h))/dh. Hence,
a sufficient condition for uniqueness is that x(h,H(h))/y(h,H(h)) declines in h. Unfortunately,
we cannot generally show that this must be the case, as it depends on the particular parameter
values. 
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
The argument in this proof is that the additional term on the right-hand side of (20), which
comes in when annuities are conditioned on healthcare investments, must be positive. This
implies that the first-order condition with conditioned annuity rates is everywhere lower than
that with unconditioned annuity rates. Consequently, any root of the first-order condition with
conditioned annuity rates must be lower than that of its unconditioned annuity counterpart.
It is, thus, sufficient to show that
−H ′(h¯)
(
1
x(h¯, p¯)
−
1
y(h¯, p¯)
)
> 0 ,
⇔ y(h¯, p¯)− x(h¯, p¯) > 0 ,
⇔ g¯(h¯, p¯)− ghh(h¯) < 0 .
When transforming the first into the second condition, we used that x(h¯, p¯), y(h¯, p¯) > 0. Us-
ing the expression g¯(h¯, p¯) = z(h¯) −
√
z(h¯)2 +m(h¯, p¯) + ghh(h¯) as introduced in the Proof of
Proposition 3, we obtain
g¯(h¯, p¯)− ghh(h¯) = z(h¯)−
√
z(h¯)2 +m(h¯, p¯) < 0
⇔ m(h¯, p¯) > 0 .
As m(h¯, p¯) = x(h¯, p¯)(p¯ + ν) > 0, we conclude that −H ′(h¯)
(
1
x(h¯,p¯)
− 1
y(h¯,p¯)
)
> 0, and hence there
is over-investment in healthcare with unconditioned annuities. 
A.8 Proof of Proposition 6
(i) The equilibrium levels of healthcare expenditures are characterized by the first-order condi-
tions (12) and (20). For the derivatives of the equilibrium healthcare level with respect to the
technological parameters ψ and pmax, we obtain via the implicit function theorem
dh¯
dχ
= −
∂FOC
∂χ
∂FOC
∂h
, (A.22)
where χ stands for either ψ or pmax and FOC for either the first-order condition in the case
with unconditioned annuities (12) or the one with conditioned annuities (20).
We will now go through each of the four cases to determine the sign of the effect of improve-
ments in the healthcare technology. Note that in each case, ∂FOC∂h < 0 according to the proof of
the uniqueness of the steady-state equilibrium (see section A.1). Consequently, the sign of the
derivatives of h¯ with respect to the parameters z will be determined by the partial derivatives
of the FOCs with respect to these parameters.
We start with the first order conditions in the case with unconditioned annuities, where the
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FOC takes the form as in (12).
∂FOC
∂ψ
=
σ
1− σ
∂H′(h¯)
∂ψ x(h¯, p¯)−H
′(h¯)∂x(h¯,p¯)∂ψ
x(h¯, p¯)2
.
With ∂H
′(h¯)
∂ψ = −βh¯
β−1 and ∂x(h¯,p¯)∂ψ = −h¯
β, we obtain ∂FOC∂ψ > 0 (note that σ > 1 and H
′(h¯) < 0)
and consequently, dh¯dψ > 0.
∂FOC
∂pmax
= −
σ
1− σ
H ′(h¯)∂x(h¯,p¯)∂pmax
x(h¯, p¯)2
.
As ∂x(h¯,p¯)∂pmax = 1, we can conclude that
dh¯
dpmax
< 0.
Now we turn to the case where annuities can be conditioned on healthcare investments and
we use
FOC =
σ
1− σ
H ′(h¯)
x(h¯, p¯)
−
1
(1− h¯)
+H ′(h¯)
(
1
x(h¯, p¯)
−
1
y(h¯, p¯)
)
=
1
1− σ
H ′(h¯)
x(h¯, p¯)
−
1
(1− h¯)
−H ′(h¯)
1
y(h¯, p¯)
For the derivatives with respect to ψ and pmax, we obtain
∂FOC
∂ψ
=
1
1− σ
∂H′(h¯)
∂ψ ∗ x(h¯, p¯)−H
′(h¯)∂x(h¯,p¯)∂ψ
x(h¯, p¯)2
−
∂H′(h¯)
∂ψ ∗ y(h¯, p¯)−H
′(h¯)∂y(h¯,p¯)∂ψ
y(h¯, p¯)2
.
We have ∂y(h¯,p¯)∂ψ =
∂p¯
∂ψ −
∂g¯(h¯,p¯)
∂p¯
∂p¯
∂ψ . As we show below under (ii),
∂g¯(h¯,p¯)
∂p¯ < 0. With
∂p¯
∂ψ = −h¯
β,
we infer ∂y(h¯,p¯)∂ψ < 0. It follows that
∂FOC
∂ψ > 0 and
dh¯
dψ > 0.
∂FOC
∂pmax
= −
1
1− σ
H ′(h¯)∂x(h¯,p¯)∂pmax
x(h¯, p¯)2
+
H ′(h¯)∂y(h¯,p¯)∂pmax
y(h¯, p¯)2
.
As ∂p¯∂pmax = 1 and consequently
∂y(h¯,p¯)
∂pmax
> 0, we can conclude that dh¯dpmax < 0.
(ii) For the growth rate g¯(h¯, p¯), we obtain
dg¯(h¯, p¯)
dψ
=
∂g¯(h¯, p¯)
∂p¯
∂p¯
∂ψ
+
[
∂g¯(h¯, p¯)
∂p¯
d p¯
d h¯
+
∂g¯(h¯, p¯)
∂r¯(h¯)
d r¯(h¯)
d h¯
]
d h¯
dψ
. (A.23)
The first summand reflects the direct effect of an increase of the productivity of healthcare
investments without effects on healthcare spending. The second expression in brackets summa-
rizes the effects of higher healthcare spending on economic growth multiplied by the increase
in healthcare investments caused by the improvement in the healthcare technology. The direct
effect of healthcare spending is positive and finite. To see this, recall from the Proof of Propo-
sition 3 that ∂g¯(h¯,p¯)∂p¯ < 0 and finite. Further we get
∂p¯
∂ψ = −h¯
β < 0 if h¯ > 0 and with limit 0 for
h¯→ 0.
Regarding the second summand, we know that d h¯d ψ > 0 from part (i) in this proof. The term
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in brackets represents how the economy’s growth rate responds to an increase in the healthcare
sector, which is described in Proposition 3. As shown there, an increase in healthcare investments
increases the growth rate at low levels of h¯ but decreases it when h¯ is sufficiently large, as
limh¯→1
dr¯(h¯)
dh¯
= −∞. Here we obtain that for h¯ very close to zero, the first term representing
the direct effect of healthcare improvements on the growth rate will vanish. Inferring from part
(i) in this proof that d h¯dψ will not become 0, as h¯ approaches 0, we conclude that the term in
brackets imposes that the effect of an increase in ψ will be positive for h¯ sufficiently small, but
negative if h¯ is sufficiently large.
We argue in a similar way regarding a change in pmax:
dg¯(h¯, p¯)
dpmax
=
∂g¯(h¯, p¯)
∂p¯
∂p¯
∂pmax
+
[
∂g¯(h¯, p¯)
∂p¯
d p¯
d h¯
+
∂g¯(h¯, p¯)
∂r¯(h¯)
d r¯(h¯)
d h¯
]
d h¯
d pmax
. (A.24)
The only difference is that ∂p¯∂pmax = 1, which does not vanish for h¯ approaching 0. This implies
that there is also a positive direct effect of a decreasing pmax on the growth rate if h¯ is small.
But ultimately if h¯ is sufficiently large, the overall effect of a decrease of pmax on the growth
rate will turn negative. 
A.9 Details on the numerical simulations
We use OECD data on life expectancy at birth for the total population (females and males) and
healthcare expenditures in % of GDP for the years 1980 and 2005. Data on GDP also stems from
the OECD. We use GDP per capita at constant prices and constant purchasing power parity
(OECD indicator HVPVOB) for the years 1980 to 2005. Out of the sample of all OECD countries
we discard all countries for which any of this data is not available. The remaining sample consists
of 21 OECD countries namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Korea, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and USA. To construct our “average” OECD country, we take
the unweighted average for life expectancy at birth, healthcare expenditures in % of GDP and
GDP per capita for both years 1980 and 2005. We then calculate the average growth rate of
GDP per capita over these 26 years, which equals 2.05%.
In line with our endogenous growth model, we assume that increases in average lifetime stem
from the interplay of improvements of the healthcare technology and the endogenous choice of
healthcare spending. This implies that also the growth rate of the economy depends on the
healthcare technology and the healthcare spending. In order to calibrate our steady state model
to observed data of life expectancy and healthcare expenditures in 1985 and 2005, we employ
the following procedure: Assume that from 1985 to 1997 the economy was in a steady state
consistent with 1985 data and from 1998 to 2005 the economy experienced steady state growth
consistent with 2005 data we calibrate a scaling parameter φ for the production function in our
model such that the average growth rate of the economy over the 26 years equals the observed
average GDP growth rate per capita of 2.05% per year.
For regime (a) for which we suppose that annuity claims cannot be conditioned on life
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expectancy and which we consider to be the observable status quo, we then calibrate the pa-
rameters pmax and ψ of the healthcare technology (1) by fixing η and β and assuming that
observed healthcare expenditures in the steady-state equilibrium are given by equation (12) and
observed lifetime expectancy is due to the healthcare technology and the healthcare expendi-
tures. Given the observed healthcare expenditures and life expectancy, we also calculate the
interest and the growth rates of the economy. Finally, we calculate the expected lifetime utility
of an individual born at time s = 0 under regime (i) and (ii). To this end, we insert (A.5a),
(A.5c), a¯(h¯, p¯) = r¯(h¯) + p¯ and w¯(h¯, t) = w0 exp[g¯(h¯, p¯)t] into the household’s expected utility
function (4):
U¯(k(0), h¯, p¯) =
σ
σ − 1
[
w¯(h¯, 0)(1 − h¯)x¯(h¯, p¯)
y¯(h¯, p¯)
]σ−1
σ 1
x¯(h¯, p¯)
. (A.25)
Comparing expected utilities between scenario (i) and (ii), we seek for the relative change
in consumption θ at all times alive for which the household’s expected utility in scenario (i)
coincided with the household’s expected utility in scenario (ii):36
σ
σ − 1
[
(1 + θ)
w¯(h¯(i), 0)(1 − h¯(i))x¯(h¯(i), p¯(i))
y¯(h¯(i), p¯(i))
]σ−1
σ 1
x¯(h¯(i), p¯(i))
=
σ
σ − 1
[
w¯(h¯(ii), 0)(1 − h¯(ii))x¯(h¯(ii), p¯(ii))
y¯(h¯(ii), p¯(ii))
]σ−1
σ
1
x¯(h¯(ii), p¯(ii))
(A.26)
Solving for θ yields
θ =
w¯(h¯(ii), 0)(1 − h¯(ii))y¯(h¯(i), p¯(i))
w¯(h¯(i), 0)(1 − h¯(i))y¯(h¯(ii), p¯(ii))
[
x¯(h¯(i), p¯(i))
x¯(h¯(ii), p¯(ii))
] 1
σ−1
− 1 (A.27)
For regime (b) in which we suppose that annuity claims are contingent on life expectancy
respectively healthcare expecnditures and which we consider the hypothetical regime, we employ
the same healthcare technology employed under regime (a) and calculate the resulting healthcare
expenditures in the steady-state equilibrium according to equation (20) and the corresponding
expected lifetime. The steady state growth and interest rates follow from inserting h¯ and p¯ into
g¯(h¯, p¯) and r¯(h¯). Again we calculate the difference in lifetime utility betwenn scenario (i) and
(ii) according to equation (A.27).
To compare regimes (a) and (b), we decompose the difference in lifetime utility in three
parts. To this end, we first differentiate expected lifetime utility (A.25) with respect to h¯.
Taking into account that w¯(h¯, 0) = k(0)1−α
1−h¯
[
1−h¯
1−ηh¯
]1−α
, x¯(h¯, p¯) = (1 − σ)r¯(h¯) + p¯ − σρ and
y¯ = r¯(h¯) + p¯− g¯(h¯, p¯) we obtain:37
dU¯(k(0), h¯, p¯)
dh¯
=
{
σ − 1
σ
1
y¯
dg¯
dh¯
(A.28a)
36See also Jones and Klenow (2010), who use a similar approach.
37For presentational convenience we drop the arguments of x¯, y¯, g¯ and r¯.
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+[
σ − 1
σ
(
1− (1− α) 1−η
1−ηh¯
1− h¯
−
[
1
y¯
+
σ − 1
x¯
]
dr¯
dh¯
)
+
σ − 1
x¯
dr¯
dh¯
]
(A.28b)
+
[
σ − 1
σ
([
1
x¯
−
1
y¯
]
dp¯
dh¯
−
1
1− h¯
)
−
1
x¯
dp¯
dh¯
]}
. (A.28c)
Thus, the first line (A.28a) corresponds to changes in utility due to a change in h¯ which stem
from a change in the growth rate. The second line (A.28b) denotes changes in utility stemming
from changes in the wage and interest rates, and the third line (A.28c) denote changes in utility
corresponding to changes in mortality and the direct effect of higher healthcare spendings.
We denote the effects in the third line as the direct microeconomic effects stemming from the
individual behavior of the household, the effects in the second line as general equilibrium effects
stemming from changes in the market equilibria of capital and labor and the first line as the
growth effect induced by a change in the economy’s growth rate.
Allowing for non-marginal changes in h¯ we re-write equation (A.28) to yield:
U¯(k(0), h¯, p¯)(ii) − U¯(k(0), h¯, p¯)(i) =
{
σ − 1
σ
1
y¯
∆g¯
+
[
σ − 1
σ
(
1− (1− α) 1−η
1−ηh¯
1− h¯
∆h¯−
[
1
y¯
+
σ − 1
x¯
]
∆r¯
)
+
σ − 1
x¯
∆r¯
]
+
[
σ − 1
σ
([
1
x¯
−
1
y¯
]
∆p¯−
1
1− h¯
∆h¯
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(A.29)
Then, we obtain:
U
(ii)
direct − U
(i)
direct =
σ − 1
σ
([
1
x¯
−
1
y¯
]
∆p¯−
1
1− h¯
∆h¯
)
−
1
x¯
∆p¯ , (A.30a)
∆U
(ii)
equil −∆U
(i)
equil =
σ − 1
σ
(
1− (1− α) 1−η
1−ηh¯
1− h¯
∆h¯−
[
1
y¯
+
σ − 1
x¯
]
∆r¯
)
+
σ − 1
x¯
∆r¯ , (A.30b)
∆U
(ii)
growth −∆U
(i)
growth =
σ − 1
σ
1
y¯
∆g¯ . (A.30c)
By switching from regime (a) to regime (b), Udirect unambiguously increases. The reason is
that in regime (b) the household chooses h¯ such as to maximize Udirect. By definition, any
deviation from this optimum can only result in lower expected lifetime utility levels. Uequil
may either increase or decrease by a switch from regime (a) to regime (b). While the term
in parenthesis in equation (A.30b), which equals the initial consumption at the time of birth,
is unambiguously positive, the last term, denoting the growth rate of individual household
consumption, is unambiguously negative. As a consequence the total effect may be either positive
or negative. According to Proposition 6 (iii) Ugrowth increases by a switch from regime (a) to
regime (b) for small levels of healthcare expenditures and increases for large levels. Expressing
changes in utility according to equation (A.27) yields ∆Udirect, ∆Uequil and ∆Ugrowth as shown
in Tables 2–4.
To check the qualitative and quantitative robustness of our baseline simulation, the results
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of which are shown in Table 2, we run a series of sensitivity analysis. In particular the spillover
parameter η and the curvature parameter β of the healthcare technology cannot be observed
directly, yet they may crucially influence the results. The spillover parameter η can be approx-
imately interpreted as a reduction in the labor costs of healthcare due to productivity increases
of increased longevity in the consumption good sector. While we do believe there are some
positive spillovers from better healthcare to consumption production, for example, because em-
ployees are less often ill, we do not believe that these spillovers can be arbitrarily large.38 As
an educated guess we employ η = 0.15 in our baseline scenario and run a sensitivity analysis
between 0 and 0.3. Table 3 shows the results. We observe that a variation in η has very little
influence on the calibration of the healthcare technology and also hardly changes the steady
state interest and growth rates. However, the utility gain from switching from scenario (i) to
scenario (ii) and switching from regime (a) to regime (b) do modestly depend on the choice
of η. We find that depending on the scenario and the parameter value of η eliminating moral
hazard due to contingent annuity claims induces an expected lifetime utility gain between 1%
and 2%. The parameter β of the healthcare technology determines the degree of diminishing
returns to investments in healthcare. Table 4 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis were β
covers the range between 0.5 and 1. We observe that for increasing β healthcare improvements
between scenarios (i) and (ii) increasingly stem from changes in pmax and less and less from
improvements in ψ. As a consequence, healthcare expenditures become more and more ineffi-
cient with respect to improving life expectancy. As a consequence, the reduction in healthcare
expenditures and, thus, also the utility gain from switching between regime (a) and regime (b)
becomes increasingly larger amounting to over 4% in the case of a linear healthcare technology
(β = 1).
Changes in the depreciation rate of capital in the range of 5% to 10% shows very little
impact on our results, as can be seen in Table 5. The main impact is on the expected lifetime
utility gain by switching to the better healthcare technology (switch from scenario (i) to scenario
(ii)). The impact on the expected lifetime utility by switching from regime (a) to regime (b),
however, is rather modest. Values range, depending on the scenario and the parameter value
of δ, between 1.41% and 1.85%. Finally, we run a sensitivity analysis over reasonable vales for
the income share of capital α ranging between 0.35 and 0.65. As we employ data on healthcare
expenditures in percentage of GDP but in our model healthcare expenditures are measured in
percentage of labor income, an increase in α also increases the observed healthcare expenditures
h. In order to match observed life expectancy, the calibration of the healthcare technology
results in higher values of pmax and lower values of ψ for increasing capital income share α.
However, the effects on interest and growth rates and the expected utility gain from switching
to a better healthcare technology are very small. Depending on the scenario and the parameter
value of α, the expected utility gains from eliminating moral hazard due to contingent annuity
claims induces an expected lifetime utility gain between 0.87% and 1.90%.
To further scrutinize the moral-hazard effect of annuity claims that cannot be conditioned
38Recall that in our model a spillover parameter of η = 1 implies that shifting labor from production to
healthcare is without any loss in consumption-good production, which is obviously an unrealistic assumption.
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η 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
Regime (a)
(h(i), h(ii)) (6.10, 8.70) 6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70)
(T (i), T (ii)) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40)
(p
(i)
max, p
(ii)
max) [%] (1.4418, 1.3664) (1.4419, 1.3664) (1.4419, 1.3663) (1.4420, 1.3662) (1.4420, 1.3661) (1.4421, 1.3660) (1.4421, 1.3660)
ψ(i), ψ(ii)) [%] (0.6015, 0.6678) (0.6019, 0.6674) (0.6023, 0.6669) (0.6028, 0.6664) (0.6032, 0.6659) (0.6036, 0.6654) (0.6041, 0.6649)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (3.62, 3.47) (3.62, 3.47) (3.61, 3.47) (3.61, 3.48) (3.61, 3.48) (3.60, 3.48) (3.60, 3.49)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.15, 1.95) (2.15, 1.95) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.13, 1.97) (2.13, 1.97) (2.12, 1.98)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 3.01 3.52 4.03 4.55 5.08 5.62 6.16
Regime (b)
(h(i), h(ii)) [%] (5.56, 8.06) (5.55, 8.06) (5.55, 8.05) (5.54, 8.04) (5.54, 8.04) (5.53, 8.03) (5.53, 8.02)
(T (i), T (ii)) [a] (72.84, 79.03) (72.83, 79.03) (72.83, 79.02) (72.83, 79.02) (72.82, 79.01) (72.82, 79.01) (72.82, 79.00)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (3.65, 3.50) (3.65, 3.51) (3.64, 3.51) (3.64, 3.51) (3.63, 3.51) (3.63, 3.52) (3.62, 3.52)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.20, 2.00) (2.20, 2.01) (2.19, 2.01) (2.18, 2.01) (2.17, 2.02) (2.16, 2.02) (2.16, 2.02)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 3.34 3.84 4.35 4.86 5.38 5.90 6.43
Comparison regime (a) → (b)
∆U(a)→(b) [%] (1.57, 1.90) (1.48, 1.80) (1.38, 1.69) (1.29, 1.58) (1.19, 1.47) (1.09, 1.36) (0.98, 1.24)
∆Udirect [%] (0.011, 0.013) (0.011, 0.013) (0.011, 0.013) (0.011, 0.013) (0.011, 0.013) (0.011, 0.014) (0.011, 0.014)
∆Uequil [%] (−0.154,−0.193) (−0.176,−0.219) (−0.199,−0.245) (−0.221,−0.273) (−0.245,−0.301) (−0.269,−0.330) (−0.293,−0.359)
∆Ugrowth [%] (1.72, 2.08) (1.64, 2.00) (1.57, 1.92) (1.50, 1.84) (1.42, 1.76) (1.34, 1.67) (1.26, 1.58)
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis with respect to the spillover parameter η.
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β 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.9 1
Regime (a)
(h(i), h(ii)) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70)
(T (i), T (ii)) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40)
(p
(i)
max, p
(ii)
max) [%] (1.4790, 1.4196) (1.4605, 1.3929) (1.4473, 1.3738) (1.4420, 1.3662) (1.4374, 1.3595) (1.4296, 1.3484) (1.4235, 1.3395)
ψ(i), ψ(ii)) [%] (0.4493, 0.5429) (0.4953, 0.5775) (0.5615, 0.6319) (0.6028, 0.6664) (0.6499, 0.7059) (0.7641, 0.8010) (0.9097, 0.9203)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (3.61, 3.48) (3.61, 3.48) (3.61, 3.48) (3.61, 3.48) (3.61, 3.48) (3.61, 3.48) (3.61, 3.48)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55
Regime (b)
(h(i), h(ii)) [%] (5.77, 8.29) (5.71, 8.22) (5.61, 8.12) (5.54, 8.04) (5.45, 7.95) (5.14, 7.65) (4.11, 6.91)
(T (i), T (ii)) [a] (72.94, 79.16) (72.91, 79.12) (72.86, 79.06) (72.83, 79.02) (72.78, 78.96) (72.63, 78.79) (72.15, 78.37)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (3.63, 3.50) (3.63, 3.50) (3.64, 3.51) (3.64, 3.51) (3.64, 3.52) (3.66, 3.53) (3.71, 3.57)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.16, 1.99) (2.17, 2.00) (2.18, 2.01) (2.18, 2.01) (2.19, 2.02) (2.21, 2.04) (2.29, 2.10)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 4.78 4.81 4.84 4.86 4.88 4.87 4.26
Comparison regime (a) → (b)
∆U(a)→(b) [%] (0.76, 0.98) (0.91, 1.15) (1.13, 1.41) (1.29, 1.58) (1.50, 1.81) (2.23, 2.54) (4.68, 4.39)
∆Udirect [%] (0.006, 0.008) (0.008, 0.009) (0.010, 0.012) (0.011, 0.013) (0.014, 0.016) (0.022, 0.024) (0.054, 0.047)
∆Uequil [%] (−0.133,−0.172) (−0.158,−0.202) (−0.195,−0.244) (−0.221,−0.273) (−0.256,−0.309) (−0.371,−0.423) (−0.713,−0.684)
∆Ugrowth [%] (0.89, 1.14) (1.06, 1.35) (1.31, 1.64) (1.50, 1.84) (1.74, 2.10) (2.58, 2.94) (5.34, 5.03)
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis with respect to the curvature β of the healthcare technology.
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δ [%] 5 6 7 7.5 8 9 10
Regime (a)
(h(i), h(ii)) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70)
(T (i), T (ii)) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40)
(p
(i)
max, p
(ii)
max) [%] (1.4416, 1.3650) (1.4418, 1.3655) (1.4419, 1.3660) (1.4420, 1.3662) (1.4420, 1.3664) (1.4421, 1.3668) (1.4422, 1.3671)
ψ(i), ψ(ii)) [%] (0.5997, 0.6591) (0.6012, 0.6623) (0.6023, 0.6651) (0.6028, 0.6664) (0.6032, 0.6676) (0.6038, 0.6700) (0.6043, 0.6721)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (3.64, 3.53) (3.62, 3.51) (3.61, 3.49) (3.61, 3.48) (3.61, 3.47) (3.60, 3.45) (3.60, 3.43)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.11, 1.99) (2.12, 1.98) (2.13, 1.97) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.15, 1.95) (2.16, 1.94)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 6.61 5.77 4.96 4.55 4.16 3.38 2.61
Regime (b)
(h(i), h(ii)) [%] (5.41, 7.87) (5.47, 7.95) (5.52, 8.01) (5.54, 8.04) (5.57, 8.07) (5.61, 8.12) (5.64, 8.17)
(T (i), T (ii)) [a] (72.76, 78.92) (72.79, 78.96) (72.82, 79.00) (72.83, 79.02) (72.84, 79.03) (72.86, 79.06) (72.88, 79.09)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (3.66, 3.57) (3.65, 3.54) (3.64, 3.52) (3.64, 3.51) (3.64, 3.50) (3.63, 3.48) (3.63, 3.47)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.15, 2.04) (2.16, 2.03) (2.17, 2.02) (2.18, 2.01) (2.19, 2.01) (2.20, 2.00) (2.21, 1.99)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 6.92 6.09 5.27 4.86 4.46 3.67 2.89
Comparison regime (a) → (b)
∆U(a)→(b) [%] (1.14, 1.44) (1.21, 1.51) (1.26, 1.56) (1.29, 1.58) (1.31, 1.60) (1.34, 1.63) (1.37, 1.65)
∆Udirect [%] (0.017, 0.020) (0.014, 0.017) (0.012, 0.014) (0.011, 0.013) (0.011, 0.012) (0.009, 0.011) (0.008, 0.010)
∆Uequil [%] (−0.286,−0.356) (−0.257,−0.318) (−0.232,−0.287) (−0.221,−0.273) (−0.211,−0.260) (−0.193,−0.237) (−0.177,−0.217)
∆Ugrowth [%] (1.41, 1.78) (1.45, 1.81) (1.48, 1.84) (1.50, 1.84) (1.51, 1.85) (1.52, 1.85) (1.54, 1.85)
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis with respect to the capital depreciation rate δ.
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α 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65
Regime (a)
(h(i), h(ii)) (4.69, 6.69) (5.08, 7.25) (5.55, 7.91) (6.10, 8.70) (6.78, 9.67) (7.62, 10.87) (8.71, 12.43)
(T (i), T (ii)) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40)
(p
(i)
max, p
(ii)
max) [%] (1.4249, 1.3409) (1.4296, 1.3479) (1.4352, 1.3562) (1.4420, 1.3662) (1.4503, 1.3786) (1.4607, 1.3944) (1.4743, 1.4151)
ψ(i), ψ(ii)) [%] (0.5644, 0.6194) (0.5757, 0.6331) (0.5884, 0.6486) (0.6028, 0.6664) (0.6194, 0.6873) (0.6391, 0.7125) (0.6630, 0.7437)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (3.54, 3.41) (3.56, 3.43) (3.58, 3.45) (3.61, 3.48) (3.64, 3.51) (3.68, 3.54) (3.72, 3.58)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 4.42 4.47 4.51 4.55 4.59 4.62 4.62
Regime (b)
(h(i), h(ii)) [%] (4.43, 6.37) (4.74, 6.84) (5.11, 7.39) (5.54, 8.04) (6.07, 8.84) (6.72, 9.82) (7.56, 11.08)
(T (i), T (ii)) [a] (72.97, 79.22) (72.93, 79.16) (72.89, 79.10) (72.83, 79.02) (72.75, 78.91) (72.66, 78.78) (72.53, 78.60)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (3.55, 3.43) (3.58, 3.45) (3.61, 3.48) (3.64, 3.51) (3.68, 3.55) (3.72, 3.59) (3.77, 3.63)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.17, 1.99) (2.17, 2.00) (2.18, 2.01) (2.18, 2.01) (2.19, 2.02) (2.19, 2.03) (2.20, 2.04)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 4.62 4.70 4.78 4.86 4.93 4.98 5.00
Comparison regime (a) → (b)
∆U(a)→(b) [%] (0.87, 1.06) (1.01, 1.24) (1.15, 1.41) (1.29, 1.58) (1.41, 1.74) (1.50, 1.85) (1.54, 1.90)
∆Udirect [%] (0.003, 0.004) (0.005, 0.006) (0.008, 0.009) (0.011, 0.013) (0.017, 0.020) (0.025, 0.030) (0.038, 0.044)
∆Uequil [%] (−0.082,−0.101) (−0.115,−0.142) (−0.160,−0.197) (−0.221,−0.273) (−0.307,−0.377) (−0.427,−0.525) (−0.601,−0.737)
∆Ugrowth [%] (0.94, 1.16) (1.12, 1.38) (1.30, 1.60) (1.50, 1.84) (1.70, 2.09) (1.90, 2.35) (2.10, 2.60)
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis with respect to the income share of capital α.
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Scenario (i) Scenario (ii)
T = 73.1 [a] h = 6.1 [%] T = 79.4 [a] h = 8.7 [%]
Regime (a)
pmax [%] 1.4228 1.3387
ψ [%] 0.4462 0.4949
r [%] 4.31 4.17
g [%] 2.10 2.00
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 6.61
Regime (b)
h [%] 4.15 6.32
T [a] 72.37 78.35
r [%] 4.42 4.30
g [%] 2.24 2.18
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 8.10
Comparison regime (a) → (b)
∆U(a)→(b) [%] 5.22 6.69
∆Udirect [%] 0.434 0.534
∆Uequil [%] 0.731 0.887
∆Ugrowth [%] 4.05 5.27
Table 7: Utility gains for a hypothetical average OECD country for improvements in the health-
care technology and switching from unconditioned to a contingent annuity claims regime in case
of internalized learning-by-investing externality and spillovers from healthcare to consumption-
good production.
on healthcare investments we run an additional numerical simulation in which we internalize the
Romer (1986) learning-by-investing externality and the spillover effect from healthcare invest-
ments on consumption-good production. This hypothetical scenario illustrates the quantitative
effect of the moral-hazard effect of unconditioned annuities without any interactions with the two
other externalities. Table 7 shows the results for the reference parameter values, i.e., α = 0.5,
δ = 7.5%, β = 0.75 and η = 0.15. We find that the welfare loss due to the moral-hazard effect
of unconditioned annuities is substantially larger compared to the results in Table 2 where we
did not internalize the other two externalities: 5.22% in scenario (i) and 6.69% in scenario (ii).
The reason is that the return on capital is more sensitive to changes in healthcare investments
if the learning-by-investing externality is internalized. As a consequence, the opportunity costs
of healthcare investments in terms of reducing the return on capital are higher than without
internaliziation of the learning-by-investing externality. We also find that now the direct effect
∆Udirect is higher and of comparable size to the equilibrium effect ∆Uequil, which itself is now
negative. Again, we find that the results are very robust over the whole parameter range of our
sensitivity analyses.
Running a sensitivity analysis over the same range of parameter values as in the reference
specification, we find that – again – results are qualitatively and quantitatively robust, as shown
in Tables 8–11.
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η 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
Regime (a)
(h(i), h(ii)) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70)
(T (i), T (ii)) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40)
(p
(i)
max, p
(ii)
max) [%] (1.4317, 1.3517) (1.4287, 1.3474) (1.4258, 1.3431) (1.4228, 1.3387) (1.4197, 1.3343) (1.4167, 1.3299) (1.4136, 1.3254)
ψ(i), ψ(ii)) [%] (0.5188, 0.5762) (0.4948, 0.5493) (0.4706, 0.5222) (0.4462, 0.4949) (0.4216, 0.4674) (0.3969, 0.4398) (0.3719, 0.4119)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (4.32, 4.16) (4.32, 4.16) (4.32, 4.17) (4.31, 4.17) (4.31, 4.18) (4.31, 4.18) (4.30, 4.18)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.12, 1.98) (2.11, 1.99) (2.11, 1.99) (2.10, 2.00) (2.10, 2.00) (2.09, 2.01) (2.08, 2.02)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 4.94 5.49 6.05 6.61 7.18 7.77 8.35
Regime (b)
(h(i), h(ii)) [%] (4.13, 6.28) (4.13, 6.30) (4.14, 6.31) (4.15, 6.32) (4.16, 6.34) (4.17, 6.35) (4.18, 6.37)
(T (i), T (ii)) [a] (72.25, 78.16) (72.29, 78.22) (72.33, 78.29) (72.37, 78.35) (72.42, 78.41) (72.46, 78.48) (72.50, 78.54)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (4.45, 4.31) (4.44, 4.31) (4.43, 4.31) (4.42, 4.30) (4.41, 4.30) (4.40, 4.29) (4.39, 4.29)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.29, 2.19) (2.27, 2.19) (2.26, 2.18) (2.24, 2.18) (2.23, 2.17) (2.22, 2.17) (2.20, 2.16)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 6.63 7.12 7.61 8.10 8.60 9.11 9.62
Comparison regime (a) → (b)
∆U(a)→(b) [%] (6.24, 7.95) (5.89, 7.53) (5.55, 7.11) (5.22, 6.69) (4.88, 6.27) (4.55, 5.86) (4.22, 5.44)
∆Udirect [%] (0.166, 0.207) (0.256, 0.316) (0.345, 0.426) (0.434, 0.534) (0.523, 0.643) (0.612, 0.751) (0.700, 0.858)
∆Uequil [%] (1.252, 1.506) (1.077, 1.297) (0.903, 1.091) (0.731, 0.887) (0.561, 0.684) (0.394, 0.484) (0.228, 0.286)
∆Ugrowth [%] (4.82, 6.24) (4.56, 5.91) (4.30, 5.59) (4.05, 5.27) (3.80, 4.94) (3.54, 4.62) (3.29, 4.30)
Table 8: Sensitivity analysis with respect to the spillover parameter η in case of internalized externalities.
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β 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.9 1
Regime (a)
(h(i), h(ii)) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70)
(T (i), T (ii)) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40)
(p
(i)
max, p
(ii)
max) [%] (1.4501, 1.3784) (1.4365, 1.3585) (1.4267, 1.3444) (1.4228, 1.3387) (1.4193, 1.3338) (1.4136, 1.3255) (1.4091, 1.3189)
ψ(i), ψ(ii)) [%] (0.3326, 0.4032) (0.3667, 0.4289) (0.4157, 0.4693) (0.4462, 0.4949) (0.4811, 0.5242) (0.5657, 0.5949) (0.6734, 0.6835)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (4.31, 4.17) (4.31, 4.17) (4.31, 4.17) (4.31, 4.17) (4.31, 4.17) (4.31, 4.17) (4.31, 4.17)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.10, 2.00) (2.10, 2.00) (2.10, 2.00) (2.10, 2.00) (2.10, 2.00) (2.10, 2.00) (2.10, 2.00)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 6.61 6.61 6.61 6.61 6.61 6.61 6.61
Regime (b)
(h(i), h(ii)) [%] (4.89, 7.17) (4.68, 6.92) (4.36, 6.56) (4.15, 6.32) (3.87, 6.02) (2.94, 5.05) (0.00, 2.30)
(T (i), T (ii)) [a] (72.64, 78.72) (72.56, 78.61) (72.45, 78.45) (72.37, 78.35) (72.27, 78.22) (71.95, 77.82) (70.97, 76.74)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (4.38, 4.26) (4.39, 4.27) (4.41, 4.29) (4.42, 4.30) (4.43, 4.32) (4.48, 4.37) (4.64, 4.52)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.19, 2.11) (2.21, 2.13) (2.23, 2.16) (2.24, 2.18) (2.27, 2.20) (2.33, 2.27) (2.54, 2.47)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 7.69 7.83 8.00 8.10 8.22 8.45 8.21
Comparison regime (a) → (b)
∆U(a)→(b) [%] (3.20, 4.25) (3.78, 4.96) (4.63, 5.99) (5.22, 6.69) (5.98, 7.58) (8.61, 10.48) (17.41, 19.17)
∆Udirect [%] (0.265, 0.337) (0.313, 0.395) (0.384, 0.478) (0.434, 0.534) (0.499, 0.607) (0.722, 0.842) (1.483, 1.535)
∆Uequil [%] (0.431, 0.534) (0.515, 0.635) (0.641, 0.783) (0.731, 0.887) (0.851, 1.023) (1.282, 1.493) (2.935, 3.108)
∆Ugrowth [%] (2.51, 3.37) (2.95, 3.94) (3.60, 4.73) (4.05, 5.27) (4.63, 5.95) (6.60, 8.14) (12.99, 14.53)
Table 9: Sensitivity analysis with respect to the curvature β of the healthcare technology in case of internalized externalities.
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δ [%] 5 6 7 7.5 8 9 10
Regime (a)
(h(i), h(ii)) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70)
(T (i), T (ii)) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40)
(p
(i)
max, p
(ii)
max) [%] (1.4229, 1.3385) (1.4229, 1.3386) (1.4228, 1.3387) (1.4228, 1.3387) (1.4227, 1.3388) (1.4226, 1.3389) (1.4226, 1.3390)
ψ(i), ψ(ii)) [%] (0.4477, 0.4932) (0.4471, 0.4939) (0.4465, 0.4946) (0.4462, 0.4949) (0.4459, 0.4953) (0.4453, 0.4960) (0.4447, 0.4966)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (4.30, 4.19) (4.30, 4.18) (4.31, 4.17) (4.31, 4.17) (4.32, 4.17) (4.32, 4.16) (4.33, 4.16)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.08, 2.02) (2.09, 2.01) (2.10, 2.00) (2.10, 2.00) (2.11, 1.99) (2.12, 1.98) (2.12, 1.98)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 8.56 7.77 7.00 6.61 6.23 5.46 4.70
Regime (b)
(h(i), h(ii)) [%] (4.09, 6.22) (4.12, 6.26) (4.14, 6.30) (4.15, 6.32) (4.16, 6.34) (4.18, 6.38) (4.21, 6.42)
(T (i), T (ii)) [a] (72.35, 78.31) (72.36, 78.32) (72.37, 78.34) (72.37, 78.35) (72.38, 78.36) (72.39, 78.38) (72.40, 78.39)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (4.38, 4.29) (4.40, 4.30) (4.41, 4.30) (4.42, 4.30) (4.42, 4.30) (4.44, 4.31) (4.45, 4.31)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.19, 2.16) (2.21, 2.17) (2.23, 2.17) (2.24, 2.18) (2.26, 2.18) (2.28, 2.18) (2.30, 2.19)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 9.83 9.14 8.45 8.10 7.75 7.04 6.33
Comparison regime (a) → (b)
∆U(a)→(b) [%] (3.91, 5.13) (4.44, 5.77) (4.96, 6.39) (5.22, 6.69) (5.47, 6.98) (5.97, 7.56) (6.47, 8.13)
∆Udirect [%] (0.443, 0.554) (0.439, 0.546) (0.436, 0.538) (0.434, 0.534) (0.432, 0.530) (0.429, 0.523) (0.425, 0.516)
∆Uequil [%] (0.310, 0.388) (0.479, 0.592) (0.648, 0.790) (0.731, 0.887) (0.814, 0.982) (0.979, 1.168) (1.142, 1.349)
∆Ugrowth [%] (3.16, 4.19) (3.52, 4.63) (3.88, 5.06) (4.05, 5.27) (4.22, 5.47) (4.57, 5.87) (4.90, 6.26)
Table 10: Sensitivity analysis with respect to the capital depreciation rate δ in case of internalized externalities.
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α 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65
Regime (a)
(h(i), h(ii)) (4.69, 6.69) (5.08, 7.25) (5.55, 7.91) (6.10, 8.70) (6.78, 9.67) (7.62, 10.87) (8.71, 12.43)
(T (i), T (ii)) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40)
(p
(i)
max, p
(ii)
max) [%] (1.4094, 1.3189) (1.4131, 1.3243) (1.4175, 1.3308) (1.4228, 1.3387) (1.4293, 1.3486) (1.4377, 1.3613) (1.4487, 1.3783)
ψ(i), ψ(ii)) [%] (0.4110, 0.4520) (0.4212, 0.4643) (0.4328, 0.4785) (0.4462, 0.4949) (0.4619, 0.5144) (0.4805, 0.5381) (0.5035, 0.5677)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (4.31, 4.17) (4.31, 4.17) (4.31, 4.17) (4.31, 4.17) (4.31, 4.17) (4.31, 4.17) (4.32, 4.17)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.10, 2.00) (2.10, 2.00) (2.10, 2.00) (2.10, 2.00) (2.10, 2.00) (2.10, 2.00) (2.11, 1.99)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 6.83 6.77 6.70 6.61 6.51 6.37 6.19
Regime (b)
(h(i), h(ii)) [%] (3.15, 4.78) (3.42, 5.21) (3.75, 5.71) (4.15, 6.32) (4.64, 7.08) (5.27, 8.05) (6.08, 9.31)
(T (i), T (ii)) [a] (72.53, 78.57) (72.49, 78.51) (72.43, 78.44) (72.37, 78.35) (72.30, 78.25) (72.21, 78.12) (72.09, 77.96)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (4.42, 4.31) (4.42, 4.30) (4.42, 4.30) (4.42, 4.30) (4.42, 4.30) (4.42, 4.30) (4.42, 4.29)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.25, 2.19) (2.25, 2.18) (2.25, 2.18) (2.24, 2.18) (2.24, 2.17) (2.24, 2.16) (2.24, 2.16)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 8.54 8.42 8.28 8.10 7.89 7.64 7.31
Comparison regime (a) → (b)
∆U(a)→(b) [%] (5.80, 7.51) (5.64, 7.27) (5.44, 7.00) (5.22, 6.69) (4.94, 6.31) (4.60, 5.84) (4.18, 5.27)
∆Udirect [%] (0.342, 0.426) (0.368, 0.457) (0.398, 0.493) (0.434, 0.534) (0.477, 0.583) (0.528, 0.642) (0.592, 0.713)
∆Uequil [%] (1.226, 1.521) (1.087, 1.341) (0.924, 1.132) (0.731, 0.887) (0.499, 0.594) (0.216, 0.239) (−0.138,−0.201)
∆Ugrowth [%] (4.23, 5.56) (4.18, 5.48) (4.12, 5.38) (4.05, 5.27) (3.96, 5.13) (3.86, 4.96) (3.72, 4.76)
Table 11: Sensitivity analysis with respect to the income share of capital α in case of internalized externalities.
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A.10 Internalizing the Spillover Effect of Healthcare Investments on Con-
sumption Good Production
The over-investment result of Proposition 5 rests on the assumption that either the spillover-
effect of healthcare on manufacturing is not present, i.e. η = 0, or it is not internalized by
subsidizing healthcare investments. Yet, when this market distortion is internalized by a corre-
sponding subsidy, financed, for example, via a lump-sum or labor tax,39 the equilibrium condition
(20) originating from the households’ first-order condition changes to40
σ
1− σ
H ′(h¯)
x(h¯, p¯)
−
1
(1− h¯)
1− η
1− ηh¯
= −H ′(h¯)
(
1
x(h¯, p¯)
−
1
y(h¯, p¯)
1
1− ηh¯
)
(A.31)
As the subsidy lowers the costs of healthcare, we observe that the second term in (A.31) reflecting
the household’s healthcare costs becomes smaller, while the last term on the right-hand side
reflecting the extra wealth obtained over the additional expected lifetime becomes larger (as
a smaller part of labor income wealth needs to be spent on health). The latter results from
1
1−ηh¯
> 1 for η > 0 and h > 0, which implies that the right-hand side of (A.31) may now become
negative and as a consequence under-investment in healthcare in the decentralized equilibrium
without annuity rates conditioned on individual healthcare investments will be possible. We also
directly observe that under-investment is more likely if the spillover effect is strong implying a
stronger increase in labor income wealth by investing in healthcare.
To quantify the strength of the spillover externality, we run an additional simulation in
which we internalize the positive spillover effect of healthcare investments on consumption-
good production (but leave the learning-by-investing externality untouched). As this implies an
additional incentive for households to invest in healthcare – beyond increases in longevity –, as
better healthcare increases the households’ wage, one expects that that households would not
overspend in healthcare to the same extent as we had found without internalizing the spillover
effect (see Table 2). The results shown in Table 12 confirm this conjecture. In fact, we observe
less overspending in regime (a) compared to regime (b). Accordingly, the welfare loss due
to the moral-hazard effect of unconditioned annuity claims is lower. However, the effects are
rather small. Compared to the standard case without internalizing the spillovers of healthcare
investments to consumption-good production, the welfare losses decrease from 1.29% to 1.23%
in scenario (i) and from 1.58% to 1.42% in scenario (ii).
To investigate the qualitative and quantitative robustness of the numerical calibration exer-
39Note that in our model a tax on labor income is not distortionary, as labor supply is inelastic.
40This condition is derived by inserting the social cost of healthcare wH(t), as defined in Section 5 and specifically
spelled out in footnote 16, into the household’s optimisation problem, as described in Appendix A.1 (possibly also
including a tax that does not depend on the individual household’s choices to finance the subsidy). Solving the
household’s utility maximization problem yields the first-order condition regarding healthcare investments as in
the social planner’s problem (17). Yet, for any given h(s), the household’s consumption path is still characterized
by the standard Euler equation (A.4). Appreciating that when all households invest the same amount h in
healthcare in steady state the interest rate r(t), the wage rate w(t) and the annuity return a(t, s) must be the
same as in Proposition 4 and LH(t) = hN(t), we obtain wH(t) = w(t) 1−η
1−ηh
and the first-order condition (A.31).
Existence of a steady-state equilibrium can be shown by following the same line of argument, as in the proof of
Proposition 4. However, for a unique steady-state equilibrium a stronger condition than the corresponding one
given in Proposition 4 is necessary.
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Scenario (i) Scenario (ii)
T = 73.1 [a] h = 6.1 [%] T = 79.4 [a] h = 8.7 [%]
Regime (a)
pmax [%] 1.4315 1.3514
ψ [%] 0.5171 0.5739
r [%] 3.61 3.48
g [%] 2.14 1.96
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 4.55
Regime (b)
h [%] 5.60 8.15
T [a] 72.89 79.12
r [%] 3.64 3.51
g [%] 2.18 2.01
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 4.75
Comparison regime (a) → (b)
∆U(a)→(b) [%] 1.23 1.42
∆Udirect [%] 0.084 0.094
∆Uequil [%] −0.199 −0.231
∆Ugrowth [%] 1.35 1.56
Table 12: Utility gains for a hypothetical average OECD country for improvements in the
healthcare technology and switching from unconditioned to a conditioned annuity claims regime
in case of internalizes spillovers from healthcare to consumption-good production.
cise, we also run an extensive sensitivity analysis over the whole range of parameter values for
η, β, δ and α. The results are shown in Tables 13–16. Again, we find that the results are very
robust over the whole parameter range of our sensitivity analyses.
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η 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
Regime (a)
(h(i), h(ii)) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70)
(T (i), T (ii)) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40)
(p
(i)
max, p
(ii)
max) [%] (1.4418, 1.3664) (1.4384, 1.3615) (1.4349, 1.3564) (1.4315, 1.3514) (1.4280, 1.3463) (1.4244, 1.3412) (1.4209, 1.3360)
ψ(i), ψ(ii)) [%] (0.6015, 0.6678) (0.5736, 0.6368) (0.5454, 0.6055) (0.5171, 0.5739) (0.4885, 0.5422) (0.4597, 0.5102) (0.4307, 0.4779)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (3.62, 3.47) (3.62, 3.47) (3.61, 3.47) (3.61, 3.48) (3.61, 3.48) (3.60, 3.48) (3.60, 3.49)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.15, 1.95) (2.15, 1.95) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.13, 1.97) (2.13, 1.97) (2.12, 1.98)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 3.01 3.52 4.03 4.55 5.08 5.62 6.16
Regime (b)
(h(i), h(ii)) [%] (5.56, 8.06) (5.57, 8.09) (5.59, 8.12) (5.60, 8.15) (5.62, 8.18) (5.63, 8.20) (5.65, 8.23)
(T (i), T (ii)) [a] (72.84, 79.03) (72.85, 79.06) (72.87, 79.09) (72.89, 79.12) (72.91, 79.15) (72.93, 79.18) (72.94, 79.20)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (3.65, 3.50) (3.65, 3.51) (3.64, 3.51) (3.64, 3.51) (3.63, 3.51) (3.62, 3.51) (3.62, 3.51)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.20, 2.00) (2.19, 2.00) (2.18, 2.00) (2.18, 2.01) (2.17, 2.01) (2.16, 2.01) (2.15, 2.01)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 3.34 3.80 4.27 4.75 5.24 5.74 6.25
Comparison regime (a) → (b)
∆U(a)→(b) [%] (1.57, 1.90) (1.46, 1.73) (1.34, 1.58) (1.23, 1.42) (1.13, 1.28) (1.02, 1.14) (0.92, 1.01)
∆Udirect [%] (0.011, 0.013) (0.037, 0.043) (0.061, 0.070) (0.084, 0.094) (0.106, 0.116) (0.126, 0.136) (0.145, 0.152)
∆Uequil [%] (−0.154,−0.193) (−0.170,−0.208) (−0.185,−0.221) (−0.199,−0.231) (−0.211,−0.240) (−0.222,−0.246) (−0.232,−0.250)
∆Ugrowth [%] (1.72, 2.08) (1.59, 1.90) (1.47, 1.73) (1.35, 1.56) (1.23, 1.40) (1.12, 1.25) (1.01, 1.11)
Table 13: Sensitivity analysis with respect to the spillover parameter η.
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β 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.9 1
Regime (a)
(h(i), h(ii)) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70) (6.10, 8.70)
(T (i), T (ii)) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40)
(p
(i)
max, p
(ii)
max) [%] (1.4632, 1.3974) (1.4473, 1.3744) (1.4360, 1.3580) (1.4315, 1.3514) (1.4275, 1.3456) (1.4209, 1.3361) (1.4156, 1.3284)
ψ(i), ψ(ii)) [%] (0.3855, 0.4676) (0.4249, 0.4974) (0.4817, 0.5443) (0.5171, 0.5739) (0.5575, 0.6079) (0.6555, 0.6898) (0.7804, 0.7926)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (3.61, 3.48) (3.61, 3.48) (3.61, 3.48) (3.61, 3.48) (3.61, 3.48) (3.61, 3.48) (3.61, 3.48)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55
Regime (b)
(h(i), h(ii)) [%] (5.80, 8.35) (5.75, 8.29) (5.66, 8.21) (5.60, 8.15) (5.52, 8.07) (5.26, 7.83) (4.44, 7.28)
(T (i), T (ii)) [a] (72.98, 79.23) (72.95, 79.20) (72.92, 79.15) (72.89, 79.12) (72.86, 79.08) (72.75, 78.97) (72.42, 78.70)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (3.63, 3.50) (3.63, 3.50) (3.63, 3.50) (3.64, 3.51) (3.64, 3.51) (3.65, 3.52) (3.69, 3.55)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.16, 1.99) (2.16, 1.99) (2.17, 2.00) (2.18, 2.01) (2.18, 2.01) (2.20, 2.03) (2.26, 2.07)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 4.72 4.73 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.70 4.09
Comparison regime (a) → (b)
∆U(a)→(b) [%] (0.73, 0.89) (0.87, 1.05) (1.08, 1.27) (1.23, 1.42) (1.43, 1.62) (2.10, 2.24) (4.17, 3.71)
∆Udirect [%] (0.050, 0.059) (0.060, 0.069) (0.074, 0.084) (0.084, 0.094) (0.098, 0.108) (0.144, 0.149) (0.289, 0.248)
∆Uequil [%] (−0.120,−0.147) (−0.143,−0.172) (−0.176,−0.208) (−0.199,−0.231) (−0.229,−0.261) (−0.329,−0.354) (−0.609,−0.558)
∆Ugrowth [%] (0.80, 0.98) (0.96, 1.15) (1.19, 1.39) (1.35, 1.56) (1.56, 1.77) (2.29, 2.45) (4.49, 4.02)
Table 14: Sensitivity analysis with respect to the curvature β of the healthcare technology.
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δ [%] 5 6 7 7.5 8 9 10
Regime (a)
(h(i), h(ii)) (4.69, 6.69) (5.08, 7.25) (5.55, 7.91) (6.10, 8.70) (6.78, 9.67) (7.62, 10.87) (8.71, 12.43)
(T (i), T (ii)) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40)
(p
(i)
max, p
(ii)
max) [%] (1.4167, 1.3294) (1.4208, 1.3355) (1.4256, 1.3427) (1.4315, 1.3514) (1.4386, 1.3622) (1.4477, 1.3760) (1.4596, 1.3943)
ψ(i), ψ(ii)) [%] (0.4831, 0.5318) (0.4931, 0.5440) (0.5043, 0.5579) (0.5171, 0.5739) (0.5319, 0.5928) (0.5495, 0.6156) (0.5710, 0.6442)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (3.54, 3.41) (3.56, 3.43) (3.58, 3.45) (3.61, 3.48) (3.64, 3.51) (3.68, 3.54) (3.72, 3.58)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 4.42 4.47 4.51 4.55 4.59 4.62 4.62
Regime (b)
(h(i), h(ii)) [%] (4.46, 6.44) (4.78, 6.91) (5.16, 7.48) (5.60, 8.15) (6.14, 8.96) (6.82, 9.98) (7.68, 11.29)
(T (i), T (ii)) [a] (73.00, 79.27) (72.97, 79.23) (72.94, 79.18) (72.89, 79.12) (72.83, 79.04) (72.76, 78.94) (72.66, 78.81)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (3.55, 3.42) (3.58, 3.45) (3.60, 3.47) (3.64, 3.51) (3.67, 3.54) (3.71, 3.58) (3.76, 3.63)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.16, 1.99) (2.17, 1.99) (2.17, 2.00) (2.18, 2.01) (2.18, 2.01) (2.19, 2.02) (2.19, 2.03)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 4.53 4.61 4.68 4.75 4.82 4.87 4.89
Comparison regime (a) → (b)
∆U(a)→(b) [%] (0.79, 0.90) (0.94, 1.07) (1.08, 1.25) (1.23, 1.42) (1.37, 1.59) (1.49, 1.73) (1.56, 1.81)
∆Udirect [%] (0.038, 0.042) (0.050, 0.055) (0.065, 0.073) (0.084, 0.094) (0.110, 0.123) (0.143, 0.160) (0.188, 0.209)
∆Uequil [%] (−0.072,−0.082) (−0.102,−0.118) (−0.143,−0.166) (−0.199,−0.231) (−0.276,−0.322) (−0.385,−0.449) (−0.541,−0.630)
∆Ugrowth [%] (0.82, 0.94) (0.99, 1.13) (1.16, 1.34) (1.35, 1.56) (1.54, 1.79) (1.73, 2.02) (1.91, 2.24)
Table 15: Sensitivity analysis with respect to the capital depreciation rate δ.
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α 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65
Regime (a)
(h(i), h(ii)) (4.69, 6.69) (5.08, 7.25) (5.55, 7.91) (6.10, 8.70) (6.78, 9.67) (7.62, 10.87) (8.71, 12.43)
(T (i), T (ii)) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40) (73.10, 79.40)
(p
(i)
max, p
(ii)
max) [%] (1.4249, 1.3409) (1.4296, 1.3479) (1.4352, 1.3562) (1.4420, 1.3662) (1.4503, 1.3786) (1.4607, 1.3944) (1.4743, 1.4151)
ψ(i), ψ(ii)) [%] (0.5644, 0.6194) (0.5757, 0.6331) (0.5884, 0.6486) (0.6028, 0.6664) (0.6194, 0.6873) (0.6391, 0.7125) (0.6630, 0.7437)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (3.54, 3.41) (3.56, 3.43) (3.58, 3.45) (3.61, 3.48) (3.64, 3.51) (3.68, 3.54) (3.72, 3.58)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96) (2.14, 1.96)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 4.42 4.47 4.51 4.55 4.59 4.62 4.62
Regime (b)
(h(i), h(ii)) [%] (4.43, 6.37) (4.74, 6.84) (5.11, 7.39) (5.54, 8.04) (6.07, 8.84) (6.72, 9.82) (7.56, 11.08)
(T (i), T (ii)) [a] (72.97, 79.22) (72.93, 79.16) (72.89, 79.10) (72.83, 79.02) (72.75, 78.91) (72.66, 78.78) (72.53, 78.60)
(r(i), r(ii)) [%] (3.55, 3.43) (3.58, 3.45) (3.61, 3.48) (3.64, 3.51) (3.68, 3.55) (3.72, 3.59) (3.77, 3.63)
(g(i), g(ii)) [%] (2.17, 1.99) (2.17, 2.00) (2.18, 2.01) (2.18, 2.01) (2.19, 2.02) (2.19, 2.03) (2.20, 2.04)
∆U(i)→(ii) [%] 4.62 4.70 4.78 4.86 4.93 4.98 5.00
Comparison regime (a) → (b)
∆U(a)→(b) [%] (0.87, 1.06) (1.01, 1.24) (1.15, 1.41) (1.29, 1.58) (1.41, 1.74) (1.50, 1.85) (1.54, 1.90)
∆Udirect [%] (0.003, 0.004) (0.005, 0.006) (0.008, 0.009) (0.011, 0.013) (0.017, 0.020) (0.025, 0.030) (0.038, 0.044)
∆Uequil [%] (−0.082,−0.101) (−0.115,−0.142) (−0.160,−0.197) (−0.221,−0.273) (−0.307,−0.377) (−0.427,−0.525) (−0.601,−0.737)
∆Ugrowth [%] (0.94, 1.16) (1.12, 1.38) (1.30, 1.60) (1.50, 1.84) (1.70, 2.09) (1.90, 2.35) (2.10, 2.60)
Table 16: Sensitivity analysis with respect to the income share of capital α.
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